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Abstract 
This paper characterizes optimal unemployment insurance (UI) over the business cycle using 
a model of equilibrium unemployment in which jobs are rationed in recession. It offers a 
simple optimal UI formula that can be applied to a broad class of equilibrium unemployment 
models. In addition to the usual statistics (risk aversion and micro-elasticity of unemployment 
with respect to UI), a macro-elasticity appears in the formula to capture the macroeconomic 
impact  of  UI on unemployment.  In a model with  job  rationing, the formula implies that 
optimal  UI  is  countercyclical.  This  result  arises  because  in  recession,  jobs  are  lacking 
irrespective  of  job  search.  Therefore  (1)  a  higher  aggregate  search  effort  cannot  reduce 
aggregate unemployment much; and (2) individual search effort creates a negative externality 
by reducing other jobseekers’ probability of finding a job as in a rat race. Hence the social 
benefits of job search are low. In a calibrated model, optimal UI increases significantly in 
recession. This quantitative result holds whether the government adjusts the level or duration 
of benefits; whether it balances its budget each period or uses deficit spending. 
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 C. Landais, P. Michaillat and E. Saez, submitted 2011 1 Introduction
This paper studies optimal unemployment insurance (UI) when workers cannot insure themselves
against unemployment risk, and unemployed workers’ job search cannot be monitored. The gov-
ernment chooses unemployment beneﬁts by trading off their insurance value with their cost in
terms of additional unemployment caused by reduced job-search efforts. A large literature stud-
ies this trade-off [Baily, 1978; Chetty, 2006a; Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997; Shavell and Weiss,
1979]. In these models, unemployment depends solely on job-search effort. But the long queues of
unemployed workers at factory gates observed during the Great Depression suggest that jobs are
lacking in recessions, however intensively unemployed workers search. Hence, existing models
seem inadequate to explain recessionary unemployment and analyze UI in recession.
To study optimal UI in recession, this paper uses the equilibrium unemployment model of
Michaillat [forthcoming]. This model combines real wage rigidity and a downward-sloping la-
bor demand to capture two critical aspects of recessions. First, unemployment is high and above
its socially efﬁcient level in recessions. Second, jobs are rationed in recessions, in the sense that
some unemployment would remain even if unemployed workers devoted arbitrarily large efforts to
job search. A key property of the model is that, although the labor market always sees vast ﬂows of
workers and a great deal of matching activity, recessions are periods of acute job shortage during
which job search has little inﬂuence on labor market outcomes.
We build on the model of Michaillat [forthcoming] by introducing risk-averse workers who
choose their job-search effort when unemployed. Unemployment beneﬁts are ﬁnanced by a labor
tax. Some frictions impede matching on the labor market, hence equilibrium wages are indetermi-
nate and labor market tightness acts as a price equilibrating labor supply and labor demand. Our
model is quite general. If we make labor demand perfectly elastic, unemployment depends solely
on search effort and we obtain the model of Baily [1978] and Chetty [2006a]. At the polar opposite
if we make labor demand perfectly inelastic, unemployment is completely independent of search
effort and we obtain a rat-race model.
Our ﬁrst contribution is to derive an optimal UI formula in a one-period model of equilibrium
1unemployment. Our formula presents two departures from the classical Baily-Chetty formula.
First, while the Baily-Chetty formula expresses the optimal replacement rate as a function of risk
aversion and micro-elasticity of unemployment with respect to net reward from work, our formula
replaces the micro-elasticity by a macro-elasticity. In an equilibrium unemployment model, only
the macro-elasticity is able to capture the budgetary costs incurred by the government when in-
creasing UI. Micro- and macro-elasticity are different. The micro-elasticity is the elasticity of the
probability of unemployment for a worker whose individual unemployment beneﬁts change. The
macro-elasticity is the elasticity of aggregate unemployment when the generosity of UI changes
for all workers. The macro-elasticity accounts for the equilibrium adjustment in labor market tight-
ness that follows a change in UI, whereas the micro-elasticity takes labor market tightness as given.
Second, our formula includes an additional term increasing with the wedge between micro- and
macro-elasticity. This wedge captures the ﬁrst-order welfare effects of the adjustment of aggregate
employment that arises from the equilibrium adjustment of labor market tightness after a change
in UI.1 Last, our formula is robust to changes in the primitives of the model because it is expressed
in terms of sufﬁcient statistics [Chetty, 2006a]. It is easily adapted to a broader class of models:
models in which wages respond to UI, such as the Pissarides [2000] model with Nash bargaining;
or models in which workers can partially insure themselves against unemployment.
Oursecondcontributionistoprovethatthereexistsapositivewedgebetweenmicro-andmacro-
elasticity in our model. When jobs are rationed, searching more to increase one’s probability
of ﬁnding a job mechanically decreases others’ probability of ﬁnding one of the jobs left, thus
reducing the macro-elasticity compared to the micro-elasticity. Indeed since unemployed workers
choose their effort taking the per-unit job-ﬁnding probability as given, they do not internalize their
inﬂuence on others’ employment probability, thus imposing a negative rat-race externality. We
also prove that this wedge is countercyclical and the macro-elasticity is procyclical. Intuitively in
recession, jobs are lacking irrespective of job search. Efforts of jobseekers have little inﬂuence
on aggregate unemployment, and the rat-race externality is exacerbated. Thus the macro-elasticity
is small and the wedge between micro- and macro-elasticity is large. Last, the positive wedge
1In contrast, jobs destroyed through reduced search efforts have no ﬁrst-order welfare effects as the unemployed
set their search efforts to maximize expected utility.
2between micro- and macro-elasticity is a testable implication of our model that distinguishes it
from standard models of equilibrium unemployment. For instance, the wedge is nil in the Hall
[2005] model with rigid wages, and negative in the Pissarides [2000] model with Nash bargaining.
Our third and most important contribution is to prove that the optimal generosity of UI is coun-
tercyclical. The ﬁrst reason is that the macro-elasticity decreases sharply in recession. Hence a
more generous UI, while reducing aggregate search effort, has smaller budgetary cost because it
only increases unemployment negligibly. The second reason is that the wedge between micro- and
macro-elasticity, which measures the welfare cost of the rat-race externality, increases in recession.
Accordingly UI, which corrects this externality by discouraging job search, is more desirable. Al-
though we model only technology shocks, we conjecture that other shocks affecting labor demand
such as credit shocks or aggregate demand shocks would affect optimal UI in the same way.
Finally, we use numerical methods to assess the robustness of our theoretical results in an
inﬁnite-horizon, stochastic model under various arrangements for the administration of UI. We
calibrate the model with US data. In the baseline case, in which the government balances its bud-
get each period and unemployment beneﬁts never expire, we ﬁnd large variations in the optimal
replacement rate: from 67% when unemployment is as low as 4% to 85% when unemployment
reaches 9%. Next, we allow the government to borrow and save. After an adverse economic shock
the optimal replacement rate responds as in the baseline case, although the government provides
higher consumption to both employed and unemployed workers. Lastly, we make the UI system
more realistic by allowing the government to adjust the duration of unemployment beneﬁts. In a
model calibrated to match an optimal duration of 26 weeks when unemployment is at 5.9%, as
in the US, the optimal duration of unemployment beneﬁts is strongly countercyclical: it increases
from less than 10 weeks to over 100 weeks when unemployment increases from 4% to 8%.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a one-period model in which we derive
optimal UI formulas in terms of estimable sufﬁcient statistics. Section 3 specializes this model to
introduce job rationing, and characterizes optimal UI over the business cycle. Section 4 veriﬁes
the robustness of our theoretical results in a calibrated inﬁnite-horizon model. Section 5 discusses
empirical evidence. Derivations, proofs, and robustness checks are collected in the Appendix.
32 Optimal Unemployment Insurance Formula
This section derives an optimal UI formula in a generic one-period model of equilibrium unem-
ployment. The formula is expressed in terms of sufﬁcient statistics (curvature of the utility func-
tion, micro- and macro-elasticity of unemployment with respect to net reward from work) and does
not require more structure on the primitives of the model. We extend the formula if workers can
partially insure themselves, and if UI inﬂuences wages. This static model transparently captures
the economic mechanisms at play; it is embedded in a more realistic dynamic setting in Section 4.
2.1 Labor market
There is a unit mass of workers. Initially, u 2 (0;1) workers are unemployed and search for a job
with effort e, while 1 u workers are employed. Firms post o job openings to recruit unemployed
workers. The number of matches h made is given by a constant-returns matching function h =
h(eu;o) of aggregate search effort eu and vacancies o, differentiable and increasing in both
arguments, with the restriction that h(eu;o)  minfu;og. Conditions on the labor market are
summarizedbylabormarkettightnessqo=(eu). Ajobseekerﬁndsajobwithprobability f(q)
h(eu;o)=(eu) = h(1;q) per unit of search effort; hence a jobseeker searching with effort e ﬁnds
a job with probability e f(q). A vacancy is ﬁlled with probability q(q)h(eu;o)=o=h(1=q;1).
In a tight market it is easy for jobseekers to ﬁnd jobs—the per-unit job-ﬁnding probability f(q) is
high—and difﬁcult for ﬁrms to hire—the job-ﬁlling probability q(q) is low.
2.2 Worker
A worker’s utility is v(c) k(e), where v(c) is an increasing and concave function of consumption
c and k(e) is an increasing and convex function of effort e. Employed workers earn a wage w(a)
that is taxed at rate t to ﬁnance unemployment beneﬁts bw(a). The parameter a proxies for the
position in the business cycle, and is ﬁxed throughout Section 2. Workers neither borrow nor save,
so consumption is ce = w(a)(1 t) when employed and cu = bw(a) when unemployed.2 We
2We relax the assumptions that wages do not respond to UI and workers cannot self-insure in Sections 2.7 and 2.8.
4denote by Dc = ce cu and Dv = v(ce) v(cu) the net reward from work in terms of consumption
and utility, respectively. Given labor market tightness q and net reward from work Dv, a jobseeker
chooses effort e to maximize expected utility
v(cu)+e f(q)Dv k(e):
The optimal job-search effort satisﬁes the following ﬁrst-order condition:
k0(e) = f(q)Dv: (1)
Equation (1) implicitly deﬁnes the optimal effort e(q;Dv), which increases with q—as the per-unit
job-ﬁnding probability f(q) increases with q—and with the net utility gain from working Dv.
For a given labor market tightness q and average job-search effort e, a fraction e f(q) of the
u unemployed workers ﬁnds a job during matching. These ue f(q) new hires add to the 1 u
workers already employed before matching, to give aggregate employment after matching
ns(e;q) = (1 u)+ue f(q): (2)
ns(e;q) increases mechanically with e and q, so that labor supply ns(e(q;Dv);q) increases with
q and Dv. q affects labor supply through the optimal provision of job-search effort e(q;Dv), and
mechanically, through the per-unit job-ﬁnding probability f(q). ns(e(q;Dv);q) is a labor supply
because it gives the number of employed workers after matching when jobseekers choose search
effort optimally for a given labor market tightness q.
2.3 Labor demand and equilibrium
In a model of equilibrium unemployment, labor market tightness q equalizes labor demand and
labor supply:
ns(e(q;Dv);q) = nd(q;a)  n(Dv;a); (3)
5where Dv is ﬁxed by the UI policy, a is the ﬁxed parameter determining the position in the business
cycle, nd(q;a) is a general function that summarizes ﬁrms’ demand for labor, and n(Dv;a) denotes
equilibrium employment. We assume that equilibrium labor market tightness q(Dv;a) is uniquely
deﬁned by equation (3). We put more structure on nd(q;a) in Section 3 when we characterize
optimal UI over the business cycle using a model with job rationing.
Equation (3) is the key departure from the canonical Baily-Chetty model of optimal UI. The
Baily-Chetty framework is a partial-equilibrium model of unemployment in the sense that it ﬁxes
labor market tightness q and per-unit job-ﬁnding probability f(q). In contrast, our framework
is a general-equilibrium model of unemployment in the sense that labor market tightness q is
determined endogenously in equation (3) to equilibrate supply and demand for labor. While the
Baily-Chetty framework studies the partial-equilibrium response ¶ns[e(q;Dv);q]=¶Dvjq of labor
supply to a change in unemployment beneﬁts, we focus on the general-equilibrium response of
aggregate employment dn=dDv to a change in unemployment beneﬁts.
A cut in beneﬁts increases the utility gain from work by dDv>0, which increases effort by de=
[¶e(q;Dv)=¶Dvjq]dDv>0 and labor supply by dns
e =[¶ns=¶ejq]de>0 in partial equilibrium with
q constant. However in general equilibrium, q adjusts so that (3) continues to hold. The response
of aggregate employment takes into account the partial-equilibrium response of labor supply dns
e
as well as the equilibrium adjustment of labor market tightness dq, which affects equilibrium
employment by dns
q = [¶ns=¶qje]dq. Our framework nests the Baily-Chetty framework as a
special case in which labor demand nd is perfectly elastic and determines q independently of UI.
But as long as labor demand is not perfectly elastic, the implications of our model differ from those
of the Baily-Chetty model because the general-equilibrium response of aggregate employment
dn = dns
e+dns
q differs from the partial-equilibrium response dns
e of labor supply.
2.4 Government
The government chooses consumption levels ce and cu to maximize social welfare
ns(e;q)v(cu+Dc)+[1 ns(e;q)]v(cu) uk(e) (4)
6wheree(q;Dv)isgivenbytheworker’soptimalchoiceofeffort(1); q(Dv;a)clearsthelabormarket
as imposed by (3); and consumptions ce;cu satisfy the government’s budget constraint:
nce+(1 n)cu = nw: (5)
2.5 Micro-elasticity and macro-elasticity
To solve the government’s problem, we need to characterize the response of jobseekers (through a
change in effort) and of the aggregate labor market (through a change in tightness) to a change in
UI. To this end, we deﬁne two elasticities.

























































If labor demand is perfectly elastic, q is determined by ﬁrms independently of UI and eM = em.
Both elasticities are normalized to be positive. The micro-elasticity measures the percentage
increase in unemployment 1 n when the net reward from work Dc decreases by 1%, ignoring the
equilibrium adjustment of q on n.3 This elasticity can be estimated by measuring the reduction
in the job-ﬁnding probability of an individual unemployed worker whose unemployment beneﬁts
are increased, keeping the beneﬁts of all other workers constant such that labor market conditions
remain unchanged. The macro-elasticity measures the percentage increase in unemployment when
the net reward from work decreases by 1%, assuming all variables adjust. This elasticity can be
estimated by measuring the increase in aggregate unemployment following a general increase in
3Equations (1) and (2) deﬁne labor supply ns(e(q;Dv);Dv) as a function of Dv and q, so the natural partial-
equilibrium elasticity of labor supply is deﬁned relative to Dv. To obtain an elasticity with respect to Dc, we need
to include the term dDv=dDc that speciﬁes the increase in Dv in response to a budget-balanced increase in Dc.
7unemployment beneﬁts. Section 5 proposes empirical strategies to estimate these elasticities.
Critically, as long as labor demand is not perfectly elastic, these two elasticities differ in a model
of equilibrium unemployment. As an illustration, consider a pure rat-race model in which there
are u jobseekers, and a ﬁxed number o < u of job openings. For a given job-ﬁnding probability f
per unit of search effort, the unconditional probability to be employed after the matching process
for a worker searching with effort e is ns(e; f) = (1 u)+ue f. At the micro level, searching
harder increases employment probability so that micro-elasticity em >0. But ﬁrms only need to ﬁll
a ﬁxed number of vacant jobs, so that equilibrium employment is ﬁxed, independent of aggregate
search effort: n = 1 u+o < 1: Hence macro-elasticity eM = 0. The discrepancy between em
and eM arises because, as a result of the job shortage, per-unit job-ﬁnding probability f falls when
aggregate search effort e rises to equilibrate labor supply ns(e; f) with the ﬁxed labor demand
1 u+o. Indeed in equilibrium, f = o=(ue).
2.6 Formula
Following optimal income tax theory, the government chooses the net consumption gain from work
Dc, which determines cu = n(w Dc) and ce = cu+Dc through the budget constraint.4 Denoting
average marginal utility by ¯ v0  nv0(ce)+(1 n)v0(cu), and using the envelope theorem as
workers choose effort e optimally, the ﬁrst-order condition of the government’s problem (4) with














To gain intuition, consider a small increase dDc > 0 in the net reward from work—equivalent
to a cut in unemployment beneﬁts. The ﬁrst term in (8) captures the utility gain of the n em-
ployed workers, whose consumption ce = cu +Dc increases by dDc: dS1 = nv0(ce)dDc. To
satisfy the budget constraint, increasing Dc requires cutting unemployment beneﬁts cu = n(w 
4Optimal income tax theory always expresses optimal tax rates as a function of the elasticity of earnings with
respect to one minus the marginal tax rate. The optimal UI problem is isomorphic to an optimal tax problem where (i)
the implicit tax rate on work is t = t +b, the sum of labor tax and beneﬁts rate, and (ii) there are two earning levels,
“working” and “not working”. Dc is directly related to t: Dc = (1 t)w.
5To apply the envelope theorem, we notice that social welfare (4) is (1 u)v(ce)+u[v(cu)+e f(q)Dv k(e)].
8Dc), which reduces by dcu the consumption of all workers, including the employed as ce =




dDc, then we can rewrite dS2 =  ¯ v0

n (1 n)[(w Dc)=Dc]eM	
dDc. The macro-elasticity eM appears in this expression of dS2
to capture the budgetary cost of the increase in equilibrium unemployment caused by higher UI.
In our model, the per-unit job-ﬁnding probability f(q) depends on labor market tightness q,
which is determined in equilibrium by (3) as the intersection of demand and supply for labor. The
increase dDc > 0 in net reward from work increases the incentive to search by dDv > 0, which
shifts labor supply ns(e(q;Dv);q) outwards. Hence, a small increase dDc > 0 leads to a small
equilibrium adjustment dq of labor market tightness. This change dq in turn leads to a small
change dnq in aggregate employment through two channels: (i) a change (¶ns=¶e)(¶e=¶q)dq
in employment through a reduction in search effort—this reduction, however, does not have any
welfare effect by the envelope theorem as workers choose effort to maximize expected utility; and
(ii) a change (¶ns=¶q)dq in employment through a change in per-unit job-ﬁnding probability
f(q). Each new job created through (ii) generates a ﬁrst-order utility gain Dv > 0 as ﬁnding a
job discretely increases consumption. The third term in (8) captures the welfare change from
this equilibrium adjustment dq. As indicated by the deﬁnition (7) of the macro-elasticity eM, the
employment change dnq can be measured by the wedge between micro-elasticity em and macro-
elasticity eM. In fact, we can even relate the change (¶ns=¶q)dq in employment, which is the only
relevant change from a welfare perspective, to the wedge em eM, as showed in Lemma 1.




































where k = ek00(e)=k0(e) is the elasticity of the marginal disutility of effort k0(), 1 h = q
f0(q)=f(q) is the elasticity of the per-unit job-ﬁnding probability f(), and h = ue f(q) is the
number of new hires.
9Using this Lemma, we can rewrite dS3 =  Dv[k=(1+k)][(1 n)=Dc][em  eM]dDc. At
the optimum the sum of the three effects dS1+dS2+dS3 is zero, yielding ﬁrst-order condition (8).
We rewrite (8) in terms of elasticities in Proposition 1.






















































where r =  cev00(ce)=v0(ce) is the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion.
If labor demand is perfectly elastic, em = eM, the second term in the right-hand side of (9)
and (10) vanishes, and the formulas reduce to those in Baily [1978] and Chetty [2006a].
The proposition provides a formula for the optimal replacement rate t = cu=ce, which measures
the generosity of the UI system. Equation (9) provides an exact formula while equation (10) pro-
vides a simpler formula using the approximation method of Chetty [2006a]. The approximated
formula (10) is expressed in terms of sufﬁcient statistics, which means that the formula is robust to
changes in the primitives of the model. Indeed the formula is valid for: any utility over consump-
tion with coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion r; any marginal disutility of effort with elasticity k
and associated micro-elasticity em; any labor demand, function only of labor market tightness and
an exogenous shock, yielding a macro-elasticity eM; and any constant-returns matching function.
Since these four statistics are estimable, the formula can be used to assess the current UI system.6
Admittedly, the statistics are endogenous functions of the replacement rate t, so we cannot infer
directly the optimal replacement rate from current estimates of the statistics. Nevertheless, we
can infer that increasing the replacement rate is desirable if the current t=(1 t) is lower than the
6Section 5 discusses how to estimate micro- and macro-elasticity. In the Appendix, we explain how to estimate k
from the micro-elasticity of unemployment with respect to beneﬁts. Many studies estimate the coefﬁcient of relative
risk aversion [Chetty, 2004, 2006b].
10right-hand side of formula (10) evaluated using current estimates of the four statistics.
The ﬁrst term in the optimal replacement rate (10) increases with the coefﬁcient of relative risk
aversion r, which measures the value of insurance. Absent any wedge between micro- and macro-
elasticity (em = eM), our formulas reduce to the classical Baily-Chetty formula. For instance, the
approximated formula (10) becomes t=(1 t)  (r=em)(1 t). In this formula, the trade-off
between need for insurance (captured by the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion r) and need for
incentives to search (captured by the micro-elasticity em) appears transparently. In a model of
equilibrium unemployment, there is generally a wedge between micro- and macro-elasticity, and
our formula presents two departures from the Baily-Chetty formula.
The ﬁrst term in the right-hand side of formulas (9) and (10) involves the macro-elasticity eM
and not the micro-elasticity em that has been conventionally used to calibrate optimal beneﬁts
[Chetty, 2008; Gruber, 1997]. What matters for the government is the cost of UI in terms of higher
aggregate unemployment and hence higher outlays of unemployment beneﬁts. Only the macro-
elasticity eM is able to capture this cost of moral hazard in general equilibrium. The optimal
replacement rate naturally decreases with the elasticity eM.
A second term, increasing with the ratio em=eM, also appears in the right-hand side of formu-
las (9) and (10) when em 6= eM. This term is a correction that accounts for the ﬁrst-order welfare
effects of the adjustment of aggregate employment that arises from the equilibrium adjustment of
labor market tightness after a change in UI. Even in the absence of any concern for insurance—for
instance, if workers are risk neutral—some unemployment insurance should be provided as long
as this correction term is positive.
2.7 Workers are able to partially insure themselves
We now extend our model to include partial self-insurance by workers. Chetty [2006a] shows
that the Baily formula carries over to models with savings, borrowing constraints, private insur-
ance, or leisure beneﬁts of unemployment. Similarly, formulas (9) and (10) carry over with minor
modiﬁcations. Introducing self-insurance through borrowing and saving would require a fully dy-
11namic model. Instead, we consider the simpler case of self-insurance through home production.
In addition to unemployment beneﬁts cu received from the government, unemployed workers who
have not been matched to a job consume an amount y of good produced at home at a utility cost
m(y), increasing, convex, and normalized so that m(0) = 0. We denote by ˆ cu = cu +y the total
consumption when unemployed, and by ˆ Dv=v(ce) [v(cu+y) m(y)] the utility gain from work.
Jobseekers choose effort e and home production y to maximize
[1 e f(q)][v(cu+y) m(y)]+[e f(q)]v(ce) k(e):
Home production y is chosen so that v0(cu +y) = m0(y). It provides additional insurance that is
partially crowded out by UI, as y decreases with cu. The government chooses Dc to maximize
ns(e;q)v(cu+Dc)+[1 ns(e;q)][v(cu+y) m(y)] uk(e);
where both e and y are chosen optimally by individuals, subject to the same constraints as in our

































Hence, formula (9) carries over simply by replacing v0(cu) by v0(ˆ cu), and Dv by ˆ Dv.7 Although the
structure of the formula does not change, the beneﬁt from consumption smoothing: v0(ˆ cu)=v0(ce) 
1 in the ﬁrst term of the formula is smaller if individuals can partially self-insure using home
production, because ˆ cu  cu. The welfare effect of the equilibrium adjustment of q is also smaller
because maxy[v(cu+y) m(y)]  v(cu) so ˆ Dv = v(ce) [v(cu+y) m(y)]  Dv = v(ce) v(cu).
Hence, if workers can partially smooth consumption on their own, the optimal replacement rate t=
ce=cu is lower than in our original model without self-insurance. As already noted by Baily [1978]
and Chetty [2006a], a UI program is less desirable in this case. This extended formula can be
implemented using estimates of the consumption-smoothing beneﬁt of UI [Gruber, 1997]. Finally,
7The Appendix derives an approximated optimal UI formula expressed in terms of sufﬁcient statistics as in (10).
12it is conceivable that self-insurance technology is not available in recessions as workers exhaust
savings or ability to borrow. This absence would provide an additional rationale for increasing UI
in recession, over and above the mechanism described in this paper.8
2.8 UI inﬂuences wages
We now extend our model to account for a possible response of wages to UI. Formula (9) carries
over with minor modiﬁcations. We assume that the wage w(t;a) is a function of the total implicit
tax on work t = t +b. In that case, a change dDc in the generosity of UI affects the government
budget’s constraint not only through a change dn in employment, but also through a change dw in
wages. Let ew = ([1 t]=w)(dw=dt) be minus the elasticity of equilibrium wages with respect
to one minus the total implicit tax on work. ew is typically positive if wages are bargained.9 The






























A new term appears on the right-hand side of the formula because wages respond to UI.10 This
term is positive if ew > 0, as higher beneﬁts translate into higher wages and hence a bigger tax
base. More importantly, the macro-elasticity eM is likely to be much higher than in our basic
model because higher beneﬁts now increase wages, depress labor demand, and hence increase
unemployment further. Therefore, optimal UI is likely to be lower when wages respond to UI.
8Kroft and Notowidigdo [2011] estimate that the consumption-smoothing beneﬁt of UI is acyclical, suggesting that
this channel may not be quantitatively important.
9Higher unemployment beneﬁts typically strengthen the outside option of workers and raise wages in bargaining.
10This formula also applies to any setting in which the government’s budget constraint is nce +(1 n)cu =
n  x(t;a), where x(t;a) is taxable output per employed worker, by simply replacing the elasticity ew by ex =
([1 t]=x)(dx=dt). For instance, it applies if the government taxes wages and some fraction of ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
133 Optimal Unemployment Insurance over the Business Cycle
This section applies formula (9) to a model capturing two key properties of recessions: (i) unem-
ployment is higher in recessions; and (ii) jobs are rationed in recessions, as some unemployment
remains even if unemployed workers search for jobs intensively. In this model of job rationing, we
characterize micro- and macro-elasticity to infer that the optimal UI is countercylical.
3.1 The job-rationing model of Michaillat [forthcoming]
The representative ﬁrm takes prices as given. It takes labor n as input to produce a consumption
good according to the production function ag(n) = ana. a > 0 measures marginal returns to
labor. a > 0 is the level of technology, which proxies for the position in the business cycle.
ASSUMPTION 1. The production function has diminishing marginal returns to labor: a < 1.
This assumption yields a downward-sloping demand for labor in the price q-quantity n diagram,
which has important macroeconomic implications. This assumption is motivated by the observa-
tion that, at business cycle frequency, some production inputs are slow to adjust so that a short-run
production function exhibits diminishing marginal returns to labor.
As in Pissarides [2000], it costs ra to open a vacancy, where r > 0 denotes the resources spent
on recruiting due to matching frictions. We assume away randomness at the ﬁrm level: a worker is
hired with certainty by opening 1=q(q) vacancies and spending ra=q(q). When the labor market
is tighter, a ﬁrm posts more vacancies to ﬁll a job, and recruiting is more costly.
Wages are set once worker and ﬁrm have matched. Since the costs of search are sunk at the
time of matching, there are always mutual gains from trade. There is no compelling theory of
wage determination in such an environment [Hall, 2005]. Given the indeterminacy of wages, we
use a simple wage schedule: w(t;a)=w(t)ag. As in Blanchard and Gal´ ı [2010], the parameter g
captures the rigidity of wages over the business cycle. If g=0, wages do not respond to technology
and are completely ﬁxed over the cycle. If g = 1, wages are proportional to technology and are
fully ﬂexible over the cycle. The function w(t) captures the response of wages to a change in the
14implicit tax on work t =t +b.
ASSUMPTION 2. The wage schedule is rigid: w(t) = w > 0 and g < 1.
We assume that wages are rigid, in the sense that (i) they only partially adjust to a change in
technology, and (ii) they do not respond to a change in UI. Rigidity (i) generates unemployment
ﬂuctuations over the business cycle [Hall, 2005]. Rigidity (ii) makes labor demand independent
of UI and allows us to focus on the classical trade-off between insurance and incentive to search.
Both assumptions are empirically grounded. Many ethnographic and empirical studies document
wage rigidity over the business cycle [Michaillat, forthcoming]. Empirical studies consistently ﬁnd
that re-employment wages of unemployed workers do not respond to changes in unemployment
beneﬁts [for example, Card et al., 2007].
The ﬁrm starts with 1 u workers, and decides how many additional workers to hire such that
employment nd maximizes real proﬁt:11

















tightness q, since the job-ﬁlling probability q(q) decreases in q. Intuitively, when the labor market
is slack, it is easy and cheap for ﬁrms to recruit, stimulating labor demand. Under Assumption 2,
w(a)=a decreases with a, and hence nd(q;a) increases with a. When technology is low, wages are
relatively high, depressing labor demand.
The equilibrium in the labor market is depicted in Figure 1 in a price q-quantity n diagram. This
ﬁgure plots labor demand curves for high (left panel) and low (right panel) technology; it also plots
11We assume that technology a is high enough such that it is optimal for the ﬁrm to choose positive hiring: h =
nd  (1 u) > 0. This assumption requires a > (w=a)(1 u)
(1 a)=(1 g).
15labor supply for low (dotted line) and high (solid line) incentive to search Dv. Equilibrium employ-
ment n(Dv;a) is given by the intersection of the downward-sloping labor demand curve nd(q;a)
with the upward-sloping labor supply curve ns(e(q;Dv);q). In this frictional labor market wages
are indeterminate so labor market tightness q acts as a price that equalizes labor supply and labor
demand. If labor supply is above labor demand, a reduction in q: increases labor demand nd by
reducing recruiting costs; reduces labor supply ns by reducing the per-unit job-ﬁnding probability
as well as optimal search effort; until labor supply and labor demand are equalized.
Jobs are rationed in recessions in the sense that the labor market does not clear and some un-
employment remains even as the search effort of unemployed workers becomes arbitrarily large.
The mechanism creating this job shortage is quite simple, and is depicted in Figure 1. After a neg-
ative technology shock, the marginal product of labor falls but rigid wages adjust downwards only
partially, so that the labor demand shifts inward (from the left to the right panel). If the adverse
shock is sufﬁciently large, the marginal product of the least productive workers falls below the
wage. It becomes unproﬁtable for ﬁrms to hire these workers even if recruiting is costless at q = 0:
labor demand cut the x-axis at nR < 1 on the right panel. Even if workers searched inﬁnitely hard,
shifting labor supply outwards and pushing the labor market tightness q to 0, ﬁrms would never
hire more than nR < 1 workers: jobs are rationed. This property implies that when the shortage of
jobs is acute in recessions, the social returns to search are small because an increase in aggregate
search effort leads only to a negligible increase in aggregate employment.
Our model is quite general as it nests as polar opposites: (i) the pure rat-race in which the
number of jobs is ﬁxed because labor demand is perfectly inelastic; and (ii) the Baily-Chetty
model in which jobs are not rationed because labor demand is perfectly elastic and aggregate
employment is solely driven by job-search efforts. To obtain the pure rat-race model, we set the
job-ﬁlling probability as a constant: q(q)=q.12 To obtain the Baily-Chetty model, we set constant
marginal returns to labor: a=1. In Figure 1, labor demand nd(q;a) is vertical for the pure rat-race
model, and horizontal for the Baily-Chetty model.
12With a Cobb-Douglas matching function h(eu;o) = wh(eu)
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Figure 1: Labor market equilibrium in a price q–quantity n diagram
3.2 Wedge between micro-elasticity and macro-elasticity
Section 2.5 deﬁned micro- and macro-elasticity em and eM. In the standard Baily-Chetty model,
em = eM. In contrast, em > eM = 0 in the pure rat-race model with a ﬁxed number of jobs. This
section shows that a positive wedge between micro- and macro-elasticity arises in our model with
endogenous job rationing.
ASSUMPTION 3. The utility functions are isoelastic: v(c)=c1 r=(1 r), k(e)=wke1+k=(1+
k). The matching function is Cobb-Douglas: h(eu;o) = wh(eu)
ho1 h.
r > 0 is the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, wk > 0 measures the disutility of searching,
wh > 0 measures the effectiveness of matching, 1 h > 0 is the elasticity of the per-unit job-
ﬁnding probability with respect to labor market tightness q, and as showed in the Appendix, k > 0
is the elasticity of effort with respect to net reward from work Dv = v(ce) v(cu). Assumption 3
enablesustoderiveasimpleexpressionfortheratioem=eM, andsimpliﬁesthestudyofformula(9).






17where c=a(1 a)[(1 h)=h][(1+k)=k](1=r) is constant. Under Assumption 1: em=eM >1.
This proposition shows that there is a positive wedge between micro- and macro-elasticity when
the demand for labor is downward-sloping, as illustrated by Figure 1. To understand where the
wedge between these elasticities come from, consider a cut in unemployment beneﬁts dDc > 0.
This change creates variations in all variables dDv, dn, dq, and de, so that all equilibrium con-
ditions continue to be satisﬁed. The change in effort can be decomposed as de = deDv +deq,
where deDv = (¶e=¶Dv)dDv is a partial-equilibrium variation in response to the change in UI,
and deq is a general-equilibrium adjustment following the change dq in labor market tightness.
Using the labor supply equation (2), we have dn = dne +dnq where dne = (¶ns=¶e)deDv and
dnq = [¶ns=¶q+(¶ns=¶e)(¶e=¶q)]dq. Following a cut in beneﬁts an individual jobseeker in-
creases his search effort, increasing his own probability to ﬁnd a job by dne > 0. From the job-
seeker’s perspective, labor market tightness q remains constant. The interval A–C in Figure 1 rep-
resents dne. However when the jobseeker ﬁnds a job, he reduces the proﬁtability of the marginal
jobs left vacant because (1) the productivity of these jobs falls by diminishing returns to labor,
but (2) the prevailing wage does not adjust to this drop in marginal productivity . Thus, the ﬁrm
reduces the number of vacancies posted to ﬁll these less proﬁtable jobs. Labor market tightness
falls by dq < 0, reducing the per-unit job-ﬁnding probability f(q) of jobseekers who are still un-
employed. This is the exact same mechanism as in the pure rat-race model of Section 2.5. dnq < 0
is the corresponding reduction in employment, represented by interval C–B in Figure 1. As a
consequence, the general-equilibrium increase in aggregate employment dn following an increase
in aggregate search efforts is smaller than the partial-equilibrium increase dne in the individual
probability to ﬁnd a job following an increase in individual search efforts. The interval A–B in
Figure 1 represents dn < dne. The difference between the micro-effect dne and the macro-effect
dn is dnq <0. This difference arises because of job rationing, and is captured by the wedge em eM
(as formalized by Lemma 1).
Policy implications. Proposition 2 has important implications for the design of UI. It implies
that private insurers under-provide UI from a social perspective. Small private insurers would
18use the Baily-Chetty formula and solely take into account the micro-elasticity of unemployment
when they determine the optimal level of insurance for their client. From the perspective of the
private insurer’s budget, it is optimal to have unemployed workers search hard for jobs to increase
their individual probability to ﬁnd a job. When jobs are rationed this additional search effort
reduces the probability of other jobseekers to ﬁnd a job, but private insurers do not internalize this
externality. If the government provides UI instead, it would take into account the macro-elasticity
of unemployment and offer a more generous UI.13
Testable implication. Proposition 2 shows that there is a positive wedge em > eM in our model
with job rationing. This positive wedge is a testable implication of our model that distinguishes
it from standard models of equilibrium unemployment. For instance, the wedge is nil in the Hall
[2005] model with rigid wages, and negative in the Pissarides [2000] model with Nash bargaining.
Estimating the sign of this wedge empirically would therefore allow us to distinguish between
these different models of equilibrium unemployment, which have very different implications for
the design of optimal UI. We now brieﬂy discuss the sign of the wedge (em=eM) 1 in the models
of Hall [2005] and Pissarides [2000].
To capture the main features of the model with rigid wages from Hall [2005], we modify the
model of Section 3.1 by assuming that the production function is linear: a = 1. This model gen-
erates large employment ﬂuctuations but does not exhibit job rationing [Michaillat, forthcoming].
In Figure 1, the labor demand nd(q;a) would be horizontal because of constant marginal returns to
labor. Hence, points B and C would be superposed: em = eM.
To capture the main features of the canonical model from Pissarides [2000], we modify the
modelpresentedinSection3.1byassumingthat(i)theproductionfunctionislinear: a=1; and(ii)
wages are determined by Nash bargaining and, without loss of generality, workers are risk neutral:
v(c) = c. The ﬁrm’s surplus from an established relationship is the hiring cost ra=q(q) since
a ﬁrm can replace a worker immediately at that cost during the matching period. The worker’s
surplus from work is Dv = Dc = (1 t)w. As the bargaining solution divides the surplus of
13We are grateful to Guido Lorenzoni for pointing out to us this application of the result of Proposition 2.
19the match between worker and ﬁrm with the worker keeping a fraction b 2 (0;1) of the surplus,








Using the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order condition (11), we infer that the wage schedule satisﬁes w(t;a) =
w(t)a with w(t)=b=[b+(1 b)(1 t)]: The equilibrium wage arising from Nash bargaining
is fully ﬂexible over the business cycle as it is proportional to technology a. It increases when
the implicit tax on work t = t +b increases, because a higher t implies a better outside option
for workers. Increasing Dc = (1 t)w by reducing t leads workers to search harder but also
reduces wages and leads ﬁrms to recruit more. In equilibrium, labor market tightness increases. In
the diagram of Figure 1, the labor supply shifts outwards and the horizontal labor demand shifts
upwards. Hence, the macro-elasticity is higher than the micro-elasticity. Formally, the surplus-
sharing condition (12) can be rewritten as Dc=[b=(1 b)](ra)=q(q) and therefore the elasticity
of q with respect to Dc is simply eq
Dc = 1=h > 0. From Lemma 1 we infer that the macro-elasticity
is larger than the micro-elasticity: eM > em.
3.3 Elasticities and optimal replacement rate over the business cycle

























The proposition shows that the wedge em=eM between micro- and macro-elasticity is small in
good times, but large in recessions when unemployment is high. Furthermore, the macro-elasticity
eM is high in expansions, but small in recessions. Intuitively, recessions are periods of acute
job shortage during which the job-search behavior of unemployed workers has little inﬂuence on
aggregate unemployment. Hence the macro-elasticity is bound to be small. Furthermore, because
20of the acute lack of jobs in recessions, searching more to increase one’s probability of ﬁnding a job
mechanically decreases other jobseekers’ probability of ﬁnding one, as in the pure rat-race model.
Hence, the wedge between micro- and macro-elasticity is large.
Assumption 4 gathers a set of technical conditions used to compute the comparative statics with
respect to technology a, taking the replacement rate t as given. These conditions are satisﬁed by
our preferred calibration later presented in Table 1, and are satisﬁed for a broad range of parameter
values. For instance, with log-utility (r = 1), Assumption 4 boils down to a condition on h.
If wages are completely rigid (g = 0), it boils down to the conditions on r and h. Finally, if
technology a is bounded above, there exists a wage rigidity g > 0 that satisﬁes equation (13).14
Proposition 4 infers the cyclicality of the optimal replacement rate t using formula (9) and the
cyclical properties of elasticities em and eM.
PROPOSITION 4. Assume that formula (9) implicitly deﬁnes a unique function t(a), continuous
and differentiable. Then under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, dt=da < 0.
This proposition proves that the optimal UI replace rate t = cu=ce is more generous in reces-
sions than in expansions. The intuition for this result can be seen using approximated formula (10)
and the results from Proposition 3. In recessions, eM is smaller as job-search has little effect on
aggregate unemployment. Hence a more generous UI, while reducing aggregate search effort be-
cause of moral hazard, has smaller budgetary cost since it only increases unemployment negligibly
(the ﬁrst term in formula (10) increases). Furthermore, the wedge em=eM is larger in recession.
Since unemployed workers choose their effort taking the per-unit job-ﬁnding probability as given,
they do not internalize their inﬂuence on others’ employment probability, thus imposing a negative
rat-race externality. The wedge between micro- and macro-elasticity measures the welfare cost
of the rat-race externality. Accordingly UI, which corrects the rat-race externality by discouraging
job search, is more desirable in recession (the second term in formula (10) increases).
14ag0(n)=w(a) > 1 is the wedge between the marginal product of labor and the wage (the wedge is > 1 because of
the existence of positive recruiting costs r=q(q)). Since employment n 2 (1 u;1], the marginal product of labor g0(n)
is bounded. a=w = (1=w)a1 g is bounded above if technology a is bounded above (which is a natural assumption at
business cycle frequency). Thus, the right-hand side of (13) is bounded above if technology is bounded above. In that
case there exists a wage rigidity g > 0 that satisﬁes (13).
214 Extension to an Inﬁnite-Horizon Model
This section veriﬁes numerically that our central theoretical result (Proposition 4) holds in an
inﬁnite-horizon, stochastic extension of the static model of Section 3. In the model calibrated with
US data, the increase in the generosity of optimal UI in recession is quantitatively large. This
numerical result is robust to various institutional arrangements for the administration of UI that
could not be studied in the static model. It holds whether the government adjusts level or duration
of beneﬁts; and whether the government balances its budget each period or uses deﬁcit spending.
4.1 The economy
Technology follows a stochastic process fatg
+¥
t=0. Together with initial employment n 1 in the
representative ﬁrm, the history of technology realizations at  (a0;a1;:::;at) fully describes the
state of the economy in period t. The time-t element of the worker’s choice, ﬁrm’s choice, and
government policy must be measurable with respect to (at;n 1).
The labor market is similar to that in the one-period model. The only difference is that at the
end of period t  1, a fraction s of the nt 1 existing worker-job matches is exogenously destroyed.
Workers who lose their job become unemployed, and start searching for a new job at the beginning
of period t. At the beginning of period t, ut unemployed workers look for a job:
ut = 1 (1 s)nt 1:
In steady state, inﬂow to unemployment sn equals outﬂow from unemployment ue f(q), so









t=0 subject to the sequence of budget constraints: for all t,
nt w(at) = nt ce
t +(1 nt)cu
t : (15)




t=0 and labor market tightness fqtg
+¥
t=0, the representative worker
chooses job-search effort fetg
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E0 denotes the mathematical expectation conditioned on time-0 information, d < 1 is the discount









+kd(1 s)Et [k(et+1)] = v(ce
t) v(cu
t ): (17)
The representative ﬁrm is owned by risk-neutral entrepreneurs. Given labor market tightness and
technology fqt;atg
+¥
























As in Hall [2005], we require that no worker-ﬁrm pair has an unexploited opportunity for mutual
improvement. Wages should neither interfere with the formation of an employment match that
generates a positive bilateral surplus, nor cause the destruction of such a match.15 In that case,
endogenous layoffs and quits never occur, and nd
t  (1 s)nd
t 1  0 is the number of hires in











which implies that the ﬁrm hires labor until marginal revenue from hiring equals marginal cost.
15As in Michaillat [forthcoming], we can derive a sufﬁcient condition for the wage process to respect the private
efﬁciency of all worker-ﬁrm matches. This condition imposes a lower bound on wage rigidity g.
23Table 1: Parameter values in simulations (weekly frequency)
Interpretation Value Source
s Separation rate 0.94% JOLTS, 2000–2010
d Discount factor 0.999 Corresponds to 5% annually
wh Efﬁciency of matching 0.19 JOLTS, 2000–2010
h Effort-elasticity of matching 0.7 Petrongolo and Pissarides [2001]
g Real wage rigidity 0.5 Pissarides [2009], Haefke et al. [2008]
r Recruiting cost 0.21 Barron et al. [1997], Silva and Toledo [2005]
w Steady-state real wage 0.67 Matches unemployment of 5.9%
a Returns to labor 0.67 Matches labor share of 0.66
r Relative risk aversion 1 Chetty [2004, 2006b]
k Elasticity of marginal disutility
of effort
2.1 Matchesmicro-elasticityof0.9[Meyer,1990]
wk Disutility of search effort 0.58 Matches effort of 1 for t = 7:65%, b = 60%
Notes: The calibration of these parameters is detailed in the Appendix.
Wages follow an exogenous stochastic process and cannot equalize labor supply and demand.
Hence labor market tightness fqtg
+¥












An equilibrium with unemployment insurance is a collection of stochastic processes fce
t, cu
t , et, nt,
qtg+¥
t=0 that satisfy equations (17), (18), (15), (19). The unemployment insurance program is fully
contingent on the history of realizations of shocks, and is taken as given by ﬁrms and workers.
Importantly, weassumethatthegovernmentcanfullycommittothepolicyplan. Thegovernment’s




t=0 to maximize social welfare (16) over all
equilibria with unemployment insurance. An optimal equilibrium is an equilibrium that attains
the maximum of (16). Finally, we calibrate all parameters of the model at a weekly frequency as
shown in Table 1. The calibration strategy is described in the Appendix.16
16There remains considerable uncertainty about some of the parameters and our model abstracts from a number of
relevant issues. Particularly, there is no consensus about the size of the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion [Chetty,
2004, 2006b]. Thus, this exercise is only illustrative of the magnitudes of the optimal policy.
244.2 Optimal unemployment insurance over the business cycle
This section considers static equilibria where technology at = a if ﬁxed (no aggregate shocks) and
analyzes how the equilibria vary with technology level a.17 Environments with lower technol-
ogy have higher unemployment. Figure 2 displays in six panels, as a function of unemployment:
(a) labor market tightness, (b) job-search effort, (c) optimal replacement rate t = cu=ce, (d) opti-
mal consumptions ce and cu, (e) optimal labor tax rate t = 1 ce=w, and (f) optimal beneﬁt rate
b = cu=w. Panels (a) is a Beveridge curve, showing that labor market tightness decreases with
unemployment. Panel (b) shows that effort decreases with unemployment. Panel (c) displays the
critical result of this section: the optimal replacement rate is strongly countercyclical, for it in-
creases from 64% to 86% when unemployment increases from 4% to 11%. The simulation in
panel (c) conﬁrms that the theoretical result of Proposition 4 also holds in our calibrated inﬁnite-
horizon model. It implies that consumption of unemployed workers increases relative to that of
employed workers in recession. Panel (d) goes one step further: it shows that consumption of un-
employed workers even increases in absolute terms. Panels (e) and (f) show that both beneﬁt rate
and labor tax rate should be countercyclical. In recession, labor tax should increase substantially,
not only to ﬁnance beneﬁts to a larger number of unemployed workers, but also to ﬁnance beneﬁts
that are more generous relative to the prevailing wage.
4.3 Formula in sufﬁcient statistics
Figure 2 depicts the optimal replacement rate t(a) as a function of the underlying technology level.
To obtain such a schedule t(a), one needs to specify and calibrate the entire structure of the model.
In this section, we present an alternative approach to determining optimal UI, which only requires
estimating a few sufﬁcient statistics that summarize the relevant characteristics of the model.
We assume that disutility of effort is isoelastic: k(e) = wke1+k=(1+k). In the inﬁnite-horizon
17Inastaticenvironment, thelabormarketisinsteadystate: theBeveridgecurve(14)holds. Insearch-and-matching
models, the comparison of static environments delivers the same qualitative predictions as the study of a stochastic
environment [Michaillat, forthcoming; Pissarides, 2009].





































































































































Figure 2: Optimal unemployment insurance over the business cycle
Notes: All computations are based on the inﬁnite-horizon model calibrated in Table 1. Each panel plots a collection of
optimal equilibria in static environments characterized by different underlying technology levels: the unemployment
rate u spans [0:04;0:11] for technology a 2 [0:96;1:04]. The Appendix characterizes these optimal equilibria, and
presents the numerical computations in detail.









































































Figure 3: Micro-elasticity, macro-elasticity, and replacement rates
Notes: Both panels are based on the inﬁnite-horizon model calibrated in Table 1. The left panel plots, as a function
of unemployment, the elasticities of unemployment 1 n with respect to reward from work Dc = ce cu, obtained for
t = 65%. Macro-elasticity eM (blue, solid line) and micro-elasticity em (red, dashed line) are deﬁned and computed
in the Appendix. The right panel plots replacement rates as a function of unemployment. The red, dashed line is
the replacement rate obtained with the Baily-Chetty formula using micro-elasticity em: t=(1 t) = (r=em)(1 t).
The magenta, dotted with circles, line is the replacement rate obtained with the Baily-Chetty formula using macro-
elasticity eM: t=(1 t) = (r=eM)(1 t). The blue, solid line is the replacement rate obtained with formula (20).
For comparison, the green, dashed with circles, line is the exact optimal replacement rate plotted in Figure 2. Each
point corresponds to a different underlying technology level a: u 2 [0:04;0:11] for a 2 [0:96;1:04].





















This approximated formula is valid in a static environment if n1, uk, d1, and the third and
higher order terms of v() are small. The term k=(1+k) in (10) is replaced by (1+k)=k in (20),
capturing an increase in the welfare cost of the rat-race externality in the inﬁnite-horizon model,
relative to the one-period model.19
The left panel in Figure 3 displays micro-elasticity em and macro-elasticity eM of unemploy-
ment with respect to net reward from work as a function of the unemployment rate for a constant
replacement rate t = 65% (the average replacement rate in the US). The panel conﬁrms that the
18The optimal UI formula (10) in the one-period environment is obtained without making any functional-form
assumption. The optimal search decision (17) is more complex in the inﬁnite-horizon environment as it involves not
only k0(e) as in the static model but also the level k(e). Relating k(e) to k0(e) requires the isoelasticity assumption.
19The Appendix details reasons why the rat-race externality has higher welfare costs in the inﬁnite-horizon model.
27results from Propositions 2 and 3 extend to this inﬁnite-horizon environment: (1) macro-elasticity
is always smaller than micro-elasticity and the wedge between the two elasticities increases in
recessions; and (2) the macro-elasticity decreases in recessions. Furthermore, these cyclical ﬂuc-
tuations are quantitatively large: the ratio em=eM increases from 5/4 when unemployment is 4% to
8 when unemployment is 11%; the macro-elasticity decreases from 0.40 when unemployment is
4% to 0.05 when unemployment is 11%. At the same time, the micro-elasticity remains broadly
constant. It stays in the narrow 0.4–0.5 range when unemployment varies between 4% and 11%.
The right panel in Figure 3 displays the replacement rate obtained from three alternative for-
mulas, as a function of unemployment. This panel illustrates the discussion of the optimal UI
formula presented in Section 2.6. The green dotted line plots the exact optimal replacement rate
of Figure 2. The blue solid curve is the replacement rate obtained with the approximated optimal
UI formula (20). Those two curves are almost identical showing that formula (20) delivers an
excellent approximation to the exact optimum. Next, the magenta dotted line is the replacement
rate obtained from a Baily-Chetty formula, similar to (20) but excluding the term correcting for the
rate-race externality. This replacement rate is lower than the full optimum because the correction
term is positive as there is a positive wedge between micro- and macro-elasticity. Finally, the red
dashed line is the replacement rate obtained from a standard Baily-Chetty formula, similar to (20)
but excluding the correction term and replacing macro-elasticity eM by micro-elasticity em in the
ﬁrst term. As micro-elasticity is almost acyclical, this replacement rate is almost acyclical as well:
it varies within the narrow 48%–52% range. While this replacement rate, used in the public eco-
nomics literature [for example, Gruber, 1997], is close to the optimum when unemployment is low,
it departs signiﬁcantly from it in recession.20
4.4 The government can borrow and save
So far, we constrained the government to balance its budget each period. The government could not
use deﬁcit spending to shift resources intertemporally from expansions to recessions and smooth
20The micro-elasticity would be slightly more cyclical with higher risk aversion. A higher risk aversion would also
increase signiﬁcantly the optimal replacement rate and would quantitatively reduce the difference in replacement rates
between our formula and the standard Baily-Chetty formula.
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Figure 4: Impulse response of optimal unemployment insurance to a negative technology shock
Notes: This ﬁgure displays impulse response functions (IRFs), which represent the percentage-deviation from steady
state for each variable. We assume that the log-deviation of technology ˇ at  dln(at) follows an AR(1) process:
ˇ at+1 = n ˇ at +zt+1 where zt  N(0;s2) is an innovation to technology. As in Michaillat [forthcoming], we estimate
this AR(1) process using BLS data for 1964:Q1–2010:Q2 and ﬁnd n = 0:991 and s = 0:0026 at weekly frequency.
IRFs are obtained by imposing an unexpected negative technology shock z1 =  0:01 to the log-linear inﬁnite-horizon
model. The time period displayed on the x-axis is 300 weeks. The blue solid IRFs are responses of the optimal
equilibrium when the government is constrained by (15) to balance its budget each period. The red dashed IRFs are
responses of the optimal equilibrium when the government is subject to a single intertemporal budget constraint (21).
Both log-linear systems and the IRFs computations are described in the Appendix.
29workers’ consumption. This modelling choice allowed us to focus on the trade-off between insur-
ance and incentive to search within each period. However, it is important to understand how our
results change when the government is able to borrow and save as is the case in practice.
In this section, we show that our results are robust to assuming that the government has access to
a complete market for Arrow-Debreu securities. We assume that the government faces risk-neutral
investors with discount factor d on the security market. An Arrow-Debreu security pays one unit
of consumption good after history at. The price of this security is dt  p(at), where p(at) is the
probability of history at based on time-0 information. The government trades securities at time 0





dt [nt w(at) nt ce
t  (1 nt)cu
t ]: (21)
We solve the government’s problem by log-linearization as described in the Appendix. To con-
ﬁrm the comovements of technology with optimal UI in a stochastic environment, we compute
impulse response functions. Figure 4 depicts the response of optimal UI to a negative technology
shock in two cases: (1) the blue solid lines are responses in the baseline case in which the gov-
ernment is constrained by (15) to balance his budget each period; and (2) the red dashed lines are
responses when the government is subject to a single intertemporal budget constraint (21). The
response of the optimal replacement rate to an adverse economic shock is almost identical whether
the government uses deﬁcit spending or not. On impact, the replacement rate increases by 0.5%;
it then falls slightly, before building again for 100 weeks; at its peak, it increases by about 0.7%
in both cases. While the generosity of UI is similar in both cases, consumption of both employed
and unemployed workers is higher when the government can borrow. In that case, the government
smoothes consumption of employed workers almost perfectly. In contrast, the consumption of
employed workers falls by about 0.7% on impact when the government must balance its budget
each period. Indeed when the government is able to borrow, its budget deﬁcit—deﬁned as bene-
ﬁt outlays minus tax revenue in the period—increases by about 1% on impact, a consequence of
the additional consumption smoothing provided to workers in recessions. Finally, unemployment
30responds similarly in both cases: it builds slowly and peaks after about 20 weeks.
4.5 Unemployment beneﬁts have ﬁnite duration
For simplicity, we assumed that unemployment beneﬁts were available to all unemployed workers,
independentlyofthelengthoftheirunemploymentspell, andthatthegovernmentadjustedthelevel
of unemployment beneﬁts over the business cycle. In practice, unemployment beneﬁts have ﬁnite
duration and governments often modulate the generosity of UI over the business cycle by adjusting
the duration rather than the level of beneﬁts.21 While we could not account for the duration of UI
in a one-period model, we build on our inﬁnite-horizon model to analyze quantitatively this option.
In this section, we assume that the replacement rate of UI is ﬁxed, that unemployment bene-
ﬁts have ﬁnite duration, and that the government can adjust the duration of UI over the business
cycle. We conﬁrm that the optimal duration of UI is countercyclical. For tractability, we follow
Fredriksson and Holmlund [2001] and assume that workers exhaust their unemployment beneﬁts
with probability lt at the end of each period t. Eligible unemployed workers receive consumption
cu
t from unemployment beneﬁts, and ineligible unemployed workers receive consumption ca
t < cu
t
from social assistance until they ﬁnd a job. At the beginning of period t, there are xu
t jobseek-
ers exerting job-search effort eu
t , and xa
t ineligible jobseekers exerting job-search effort ea
t . The
matching process is the same as in the baseline model of Section 4.1, except that we redeﬁne labor




t ). After the matching, zu
t eligible jobseekers and za
t ineli-




t  f(qt)), za
t = xa
t (1 ea








t 1. Worker’s and ﬁrm’s problems are very similar to those in Section 4.1,
and are described in the Appendix. We assume that the generosity of unemployment beneﬁts:
tu;e = cu
t =ce
t, as well as the generosity of social assistance: ta;e = ca
t =ce
t, are constant over time.
The government chooses the rate lt at which eligible unemployed workers become ineligible, in
21US unemployment beneﬁts have a maximum duration of 26 weeks in normal times. Duration is automatically
extended by up to 20 weeks in states where unemployment is above 8%. Duration is often further extended by
the government in severe recessions. For example, the federal Emergency Unemployment Compensation program,
enacted in 2008, extends durations by an additional 53 weeks when state unemployment is above 8.5%.















subject to a budget constraint in each period t:






We calibrate the model so that an expected duration of 26 weeks is optimal when the unemploy-
ment rate is at its average level of 5:9%. The left panel in Figure 5 shows how unemployment and
its composition varies with technology. When technology increases, total unemployment falls, the
number of eligible jobseekers falls, but the number of ineligible jobseekers increases because the
expected duration of beneﬁts falls drastically. In fact, all unemployed workers should be eligible
when unemployment reaches 9%, whereas only 60% of them should be eligible when unemploy-
ment falls to 4%. The government chooses the arrival rate l of ineligibility, and the expected
duration of unemployment beneﬁts is 1=l. The right panel shows that quantitatively, the optimal
expected duration of beneﬁts is strongly countercyclical. When unemployment is 4%, the optimal
arrival rate of ineligibility is 15% and the optimal expected duration of beneﬁts is 7 weeks. When
unemployment reaches 5.9%, the optimal arrival rate falls to 3.9%, and the optimal duration of
beneﬁts increases to 26 weeks. Finally, when unemployment reaches 8.0%, the optimal arrival rate
drops to 0.5%, and the optimal duration of beneﬁts increases to 200 weeks.22
5 Some Empirical Evidence
To assess the current UI system over the business cycle using formula (20), we need estimates of
micro- and macro-elasticity at various points of the business cycle. Although a large empirical
literature examines the effects of UI on unemployment duration, no study has estimated separately
22As the government chooses the instantaneous arrival rate of ineligibility, durations would not last 200 weeks if a
recession ends quickly. The key point is that jobseekers hardly ever loose their eligibility to UI during deep recessions.






























































Figure 5: Optimal duration of unemployment beneﬁts
Notes: Both panels are obtained with the inﬁnite-horizon model in which unemployment beneﬁts have ﬁnite duration.
The model is calibrated according to Table 1 (except that wk = 0:43 here). These panels plot optimal equilibria in
static environments corresponding to different underlying technology levels. In the right panel, u 2 [0:04;0:09] for
a 2 [0:96;1:04]. The Appendix characterizes the optimal equilibria, and describes calibration and simulations.
micro-andmacro-elasticity, letalonethecyclicalityofthesetwoelasticities. Thissectiondiscusses
the ideal experiments to estimate micro- and macro-elasticity, reviews the existing ﬁndings of the
literature, and reports our own new estimates of micro-elasticity over the US business cycle.
5.1 Estimating the micro-elasticity of unemployment
The ideal experiment to estimate the micro-elasticity is to offer higher UI beneﬁts to a randomly
selected small subset of individuals within a labor market and compare unemployment durations
between these treated individuals and the rest of the unemployed. Studies in the literature compar-
ing individuals with different beneﬁts in the same labor market at a given time, while controlling
for individual characteristics, estimate primarily micro-elasticities. To investigate the cyclicality of
the micro-elasticity, it is necessary to replicate this estimation across labor markets with different
unemployment levels. The closest empirical setting to the ideal experiment is that of Schmieder et
al. [2011]. They use sharp variations in the potential duration of unemployment beneﬁts by age in
Germany, population-wide administrative data, and a regression discontinuity approach to identify
compellingly the micro-elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the potential duration
33of beneﬁt entitlement. Their elasticity estimates are broadly constant over the German business
cycle. The estimates are also small in magnitude relative to estimates of elasticities with respect to
beneﬁt levels such as Meyer [1990].
To estimate the micro-elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to beneﬁt levels, we
use administrative data from the Continuous Wage and Beneﬁt History (CWBH) that record em-
ployment and unemployment history for all workers in 8 US states from 1976 to 1983. To identify
the micro-elasticity, we estimate the effect of beneﬁts using only within stateyear variations in
individual beneﬁts. We ﬁt a Cox proportional hazard model with state and year ﬁxed effects in-
teracted, and controlling for observable characteristics of the unemployed (age, education, marital
status, ethnicity, number of dependents). We also introduce a series of non-parametric controls for
previous wage and previous work experience. When adding this rich set of controls, the residual
variation in beneﬁts is likely to be exogenous, and comes primarily from non-linearities in the ben-
eﬁt schedule. We estimate this model for low- and high-unemployment regimes.23 The Appendix
provides all the details. Our main ﬁnding is that the elasticity of duration with respect to beneﬁts
is 0.34 (0.04) for low-unemployment regimes, and 0.32 (0.04) for high-unemployment regimes.24
These estimates are very close, suggesting that the micro-elasticity is acyclical as in the simulation
of our calibrated model presented in Figure 3. These ﬁndings imply that the conventional Baily-
Chetty formula would recommend a constant replacement rate over the business cycle, in sharp
contrast with the optimal UI in our calibrated model, displayed in Figure 2.
5.2 Estimating the macro-elasticity of unemployment
The ideal experiment to estimate the macro-elasticity is to offer higher UI beneﬁts to all individ-
uals in a randomly selected subset of labor markets and compare unemployment durations across
treated and control labor markets. Estimating the macro-elasticity is inherently more difﬁcult than
23A spell is in a low unemployment regime if the quarterly unemployment rate of the state is below the median
unemployment rate of all states in the US at the beginning of the spell.
24Those estimates are lower than the classic estimates of Meyer [1990]. As shown in Table A1 in the Appendix,
we can replicate almost perfectly the higher magnitude of the estimates of Meyer [1990] when using his exact set of
controls (i.e., not including stateyear ﬁxed effects nor non-parametric controls in prior wages and experience). This
suggests that the discrepancy in magnitude is likely due to omitted variable bias in Meyer [1990] estimates.
34estimating the micro-elasticity because it requires ﬁnding exogenous variation in beneﬁts across a
large set of otherwise comparable labor markets, instead of exogenous variation across individu-
als within a single labor market. Estimating the cyclicality of the macro-elasticity would require
repeating the same experiment for different initial levels of labor market tightness. Although no
existing study offers compelling identiﬁcation of the macro-elasticity, studies comparing individ-
uals with different beneﬁts across labor markets—for example across US states or within state
over time—capture mainly macro-elasticities. Mofﬁtt [1985] ﬁnds that estimates of the elasticity
of unemployment duration with respect to unemployment beneﬁts decline signiﬁcantly with state
unemployment rates. More recently, Valletta and Kuang [2010] ﬁnd modest effects of unemploy-
ment beneﬁt extensions on average unemployment in the US Great Recession. Using survey data,
Kroft and Notowidigdo [2011] use variation in average beneﬁts within states over time, control-
ling for state ﬁxed effects. They provide the most convincing evidence to date that the elasticity of
duration with respect to beneﬁts is smaller when state unemployment is higher, suggesting that the
macro-elasticity is countercyclical. In contrast to our basic job-rationing theory, their estimates are
larger than our micro-elasticity estimates presented above. This could be due to differences in time
periods and data, potential endogeneity in the variation of average state beneﬁts over time in Kroft
and Notowidigdo [2011], or other factors increasing the macro-elasticity (such as wage bargaining
discussed at the end of Section 3.2). Unfortunately the CWBH data used above do not span a long
enough time period, and therefore do not include sufﬁcient variation in average beneﬁts within
state over time, for us to investigate the cyclicality of the macro-elasticity.25
5.3 Alternative: estimating the wedge between micro- and macro-elasticity
As it is difﬁcult to obtain comparable estimates of both the micro- and macro-elasticity, it may
be easier to estimate directly the wedge between micro- and macro-elasticity. This could be done
by analyzing whether there are search spillovers. The ideal experiment is to offer higher beneﬁts
to a large fraction of randomly chosen individuals in a randomly selected subset of labor mar-
25The elasticity of duration with respect to average beneﬁts in each statequarter found ﬁtting our Cox proportional
hazard model without state ﬁxed effects is higher for low- than for high-unemployment regimes. The validity of such
estimates, however, is questionable because they suffer from a potentially serious omitted variable bias.
35kets and compare unemployment durations of untreated individuals across treated labor markets
and control labor markets. Because a change in beneﬁts for a large fraction of workers within a
labor market affects aggregate search effort, it affects labor market tightness and ultimately unem-
ployment durations of workers who did not experience a change in beneﬁts. A small body of work
ﬁnds evidence of such a rat-race externality, although identiﬁcation is not fully satisfactory. Levine
[1993] ﬁnds that an increase in beneﬁts for insured unemployed workers results in a reduction of
unemployment duration among uninsured workers. Burgess and Proﬁt [2001] also ﬁnd evidence
of such externalities across neighboring areas. Policy variation could be used to credibly test for
spillover effects. For example, the Regional Extended Beneﬁt Program (REBP) in Austria dramat-
ically increased the duration of beneﬁts from 30 to 209 weeks for workers aged above 50 in some
regions of Austria during 1988–1993. Lalive [2008] shows that this program led to a large de-
crease in job-search effort for treated workers. Evaluating whether comparable untreated workers
in treated regions experience a reduction in unemployment duration could provide a compelling
estimate of spillover effects. This project is left for future research.
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37Appendix – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
A Proofs
A.1 Notations
We deﬁne the following functions, which we study in the Appendix:
• Labor supply: ns(e;q) is increasing in e and q, and is deﬁned by
ns(e;q) = (1 u)+ue f(q):











• Effort supply: es(q;Dv) is increasing in q and Dv, and is deﬁned implicitly by
k0(es) = f(q)Dv:






























: T(n;q) is deﬁned by
T(n;q) = cq(q)[n (1 u)]na 1 = cq(q)hna 1
• Equilibrium labor market tightness: q(a;Dv) is deﬁned implicitly by
nd(q;a) = ns(es(q;Dv);q)
• Equilibrium effort: e(a;Dv) is deﬁned by
e(a;Dv) = es(q(a;Dv);Dv)
38• Equilibrium employment: n(a;Dv) is deﬁned by
n(a;Dv) = ns(e(a;Dv);q(a;Dv))




: R(a;Dv) is deﬁned by
R(a;Dv) = Q(n(a;Dv);q(a;Dv))




: X(a;Dv) is deﬁned by
X(a;Dv) = T(n(a;Dv);q(a;Dv)) (A2)




• Equilibrium labor market tightness: q(a;t) is deﬁned by
q(a;t) = q(a;Dv(a;t))
• Equilibrium effort: e(a;t) is deﬁned by
e(a;t) = e(q(a;t);Dv(a;t))
• Equilibrium employment: n(a;t) is deﬁned by
n(a;t) = n(a;Dv(a;t))




: R(a;t) is deﬁned by
R(a;t) = R(a;Dv(a;t))




: X(a;t) is deﬁned by
X(a;t) = X(a;Dv(a;t))








• Equilibrium labor market tightness: q†(a;Dc) is deﬁned by
q†(a;Dc) = q(a;Dv†(a;Dc))
• Equilibrium effort: e†(a;Dc) is deﬁned by
e†(a;Dc) = e(q†(a;Dc);Dv†(a;Dc))
• Equilibrium employment: n†(a;Dc) is deﬁned by
n†(a;Dc) = n(a;Dv†(a;Dc))
• Equilibrium consumption: cu†(a;Dc) is deﬁned by
cu†(a;Dc) = n†(a;Dc)(w(a) Dc)



















































































A.2 Proof of Lemma 1









































































































LEMMA A1. Denote k = ek00(e)=k0(e) the elasticity of the marginal disutility of effort k0(e),
and denote 1 h = q f0(q)=f(q) the elasticity of the per-unit job-ﬁnding probability. The partial
















Proof. The worker’s optimal choice of effort (1) gives k0(es)= f(q)Dv. Thus, differentiating with





























LEMMA A2. Denote k = ek00(e)=k0(e) the elasticity of the marginal disutility of effort k0(e),
and denote 1 h = q f0(q)=f(q) the elasticity of the per-unit job-ﬁnding probability. Denote
























Proof. The ﬁrst two results are obvious using the deﬁnition (2) of labor supply: ns(e;q) = (1 








































































Multiplying each equation by Dc
Dv  ¶Dv†
¶Dc yields our result. The second result in the lemma is obtained
42by combining the ﬁrst result with the result of Lemma A2. Note that these results can be rewritten









































A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The government chooses Dc to maximize:
(1 u)v(ce)+u[v(cu)+e f(q)Dv k(e)] = ns(e;q)v(cu+Dc)+(1 ns(e;q))v(cu) uk(e)
Using the envelope theorem (as workers choose search effort e to maximize v(cu)+e f(q)Dv 























where we deﬁne v0  [nv0(ce)+(1 n)v0(cu)].




















































































































































































































































































A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Step 1: Equivalence with ratio “in utility”. Notice that n†(a;Dc) = n(a;Dv†(a;Dc)). Hence










































In this step, we work with elasticities “in utility” as they are easier to manipulate.
Step 2: Differentiate the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order condition. The ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order condition, evalu-




Under Assumption 3, we differentiate the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to Dv keeping a con-













































































Then since q > 0, h > 0, h 2 (0;1): em=eM > 1 iff a 2 (0;1).
45A.5 Some preliminary comparative-static results
LEMMA A4. Denote k=ek00(e)=k0(e) the elasticity of the marginal disutility of effort k0(e), and





























































































Assume g 2 [0;1) and a 2 (0;1). We have ¶nd
¶q < 0; ¶nd
¶a > 0. Differentiating equilibrium condi-



























































Thus we infer that ¶q
¶a > 0. We conclude by using the comparative statics (A8) and noting that
e(a;Dv) = es(q(a;Dv);Dv) and n(a;Dv) = ns(e(a;Dv);q(a;Dv)).
























¶q < 0. Differentiating equilibrium condition on the labor market (3) with respect to







































































We can conclude that ¶q






LEMMA A7. Under Assumptions 1, 2,and 3, ¶X
¶Dv > 0. Furthermore, if h  1+k
1+2k, then ¶X
¶a < 0.













We make Assumption 1 such that T > 0; X > 0.














We can conclude that ¶X







































































































From Lemma A5, under Assumption 2, ¶q
¶a > 0. Hence ¶X






























48Since h=n > 0, a sufﬁcient condition for ¶X
¶a < 0 is h  1+k
1+2k.
LEMMA A8. Under Assumptions 1, 2,and 3, ¶R
¶Dv > 0. Furthermore, ¶R
¶a < 0 if h  1+k
1+2k.
Proof. We make Assumption 3 such that R(a;Dv) be well deﬁned. We make Assumption 1 such
that R > 0.
Step1. Usingtheequilibriumconditionn(a;Dv)=ns(es(q(a;Dv);Dv);q(a;Dv)), wedifferentiate




















































































Under Assumption 2: ¶q
¶a > 0. Hence ¶R









Since h=n > 0, a sufﬁcient condition for ¶R
¶a < 0 is h  1+k
1+2k.



























































































Since h=n  1, we conclude that ¶R
¶Dv > 0.






























which satisﬁes z0(t) =  t r < 0. Let us ﬁx t and consider a marginal change da. We denote
50ˇ x = dln(x) = dx=x. Differentiating the expression above:

































































We know from Lemma A5 that under Assumption 2, ¶n
¶a > 0 and from Lemma A6 that ¶n
¶Dv > 0
such that eM
v > 0. We infer that if r  1, ¶Dv
¶a  0.
LEMMAA10. UnderAssumptions1,2,3, and imposingr1 and h(1+k)=(1+2k): ¶R
¶a <0.
Proof. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, using Lemmas A8 and A9 when r  1 and h  1+k
1+2k, then
¶R
















LEMMAA11. UnderAssumptions1,2,3, andimposingr1andh(1+k)=(1+2k): ¶X
¶a <0.
Proof. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, using Lemmas A7 and A9 when r  1 and h  1+k
1+2k, then
¶X



































































Recall that n(a;t) = n(a;Dv(a;t)). Given that r  1, the sign of ¶n






















































Under Assumption 1, we evaluate the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order condition (11) at the equilibrium employ-
ment n(a;Dv)=ns(es(q(a;Dv);Dv);q(a;Dv)) and labor market tightness q(a;Dv). We differentiate
















a = (g 1)[1  j(q;n)]+ j(q;n)heq
a










































a = (1 g)[1  j(q;n)]
eq















































































Under Assumption 3, Q(n;q)  0. Signing ¶n




























































































We can express the constant W solely as a function of the parameters of the model (more pre-
cisely the boundaries of the admissible values for the parameters). Since n(a;t) 2 (1 u;1] and



















54A.6 Proof of Proposition 3









Proof. Immediate using the fact that under Assumption 3, v(c) = c1 r=(1 r), v0(c) = c r, and
t cu=ce.
Step 1: cyclicality of em=eM. From Lemma A10, because under Assumption 3, em=eM = 1+
R(a;t).
Step 2: cyclicality of eM. We express eM as a function of eM
v and t. Using Lemma A3 and


















































































































v ) 1+ j(t)i(t) 1 n
n
(A13)






k+1 W, then ¶n
¶a > 0. Using Lemma A4: em
v = (1=k)[(n (1 u))=n]. Under
Assumption 3, the elasticity k is a constant and therefore em








Under Assumption 3, em
v =eM
v =1+R(a;t). According to Lemma A10, under Assumptions 1, 2, 3,
and imposing r  1 and h  (1+k)=(1+2k), ¶R










A.7 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof requires using the elasticities of unemployment “in utility” (em
v ;eM
v ) instead of the elas-
ticities of unemployment “in consumption” (em;eM) used in the text. Therefore, we re-derive our
optimal UI formula (9) in terms of the elasticities em
v ;eM
v .








































First step. The government chooses Dv to maximize:
max(1 u)v(ce)+uv(cu)+ue f(q)Dv uk(e) = v(cu)+ns(e;q)Dv uk(e)











































































































































































































































































































































Recall that h = n (1 u). We can rewrite the optimal UI formula as
F(t) = Q(t;n;X):

































































Noting that h=n  1, and n 2 (0;1) allows us to conclude ¶Q
¶t < 0. Since n 2 (0;1), ¶Q
¶X > 0.
Assuming that n 2 [1=2;1), and noting that 0  h=n  1, X  0, we can conclude ¶Q
¶n < 0.
The optimality condition can be expressed as
F(t) = Q(t;n(a;t);X(a;t)):
Let us deﬁne
G(t;a)  Q(t;n(a;t);X(a;t)): (A16)
We assume that F(t) and G(t;a) cross only once for t 2 (0;1), such that the solution to the
government’s problem is unique. The function t(a), which characterizes the optimal replacement
rate, is deﬁned implicitly as the unique intersection of these two curves.














We are at technology a and optimal replacement rate t(a). We consider a marginal change in
technology to a > a. At t(a),
F(t(a)) = Q(t(a);n(a;t(a));X(a;t(a))) > Q(t(a);n(a;t(a));X(a;t(a))):
We assume that F(t) and G(t;a) cross only once for t 2 [0;1]. Moreover, limt!0F(t) = 0. At the
same time limt!0G(t;a) > 0. To see this, consider the following two cases:
1. limt!0n = n0 2 [1 u;1). Since X  0 and h  u, using the deﬁnition (A16) of G and










































B Extensions in the One-Period Model
B.1 Workers can partially insure themselves
An unemployed worker consumes y in addition to the unemployment beneﬁts cu received from
the government. We denote ˆ cu = cu +y the total consumption when unemployed. Unemployed
workers now pick effort e and home production y to maximize
[1 e f(q)][v(cu+y) m(y)]+[e f(q)]v(ce) k(e)
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to y yields:
m0(y) = v0(cu+y); (A17)
which implicitly deﬁnes optimal home production y(cu). The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to
e yields:
k0(e) = f(q) ˆ Dv;
where we denote ˆ Dv = v(ce) [v(cu+y(cu)) m(y(cu))] the utility difference between being em-
ployed and unemployed. This ﬁrst-order condition implicitly deﬁnes optimal effort e(q; ˆ Dv).
60The government chooses Dc to maximize:
(1 u)v(ce)+uf[1 e f(q)][v(cu+y) m(y)]+[e f(q)]v(ce) k(e)g
= ns(e;q)v(cu+Dc)+[1 ns(e;q)][v(cu+y) m(y)] uk(e)
Using the envelope theorem, as workers choose search effort e and home production y to maximize















As in the case without self-insurance, we derive the optimal UI formula in three steps. The ﬁrst
and second step are identical to those in the case without self-insurance (notice that the proof of
Lemma 1 would be modiﬁed by taking derivatives with respect to ˆ Dv instead of Dv. However, the

















































































































To approximate the second term, we need to assume that m() is isoelastic: m(y) = wm
y1+µ
1+µ with



































































If unemployed workers fully insure themselves without any insurance from the government: cu =0
and ˆ cu = y = ce. This implies that t = 0 such that the left-hand side of the formula is nil. It also
implies that xt = ˆ cu=ce = 1 (and t(x 1) = tx t = 1), such that the right-hand side of the
formula is positive. Therefore, even though workers can fully insure themselves without UI, it is
optimal for the government to provide some UI because of the cost of home production.
B.2 UI inﬂuences wages
If UI inﬂuences wages, labor demand becomes a function of UI: nd = nd(a;q;Dc), which reﬂects
the inﬂuence of UI on ﬁrm’s recruiting decision through wages. Labor market tightness q†(a;Dc)
is now characterized by
nd(q;Dc) = ns(es(q;Dv†(a;Dc));q):
This generalization does not affect the derivations: the macro-elasticity captures the inﬂuence of
UI on aggregate employment and labor market tightness through all channels, including possibly
62wages. If the equilibrium wage responds to Dc: w = w†(a;Dc), we amend the budget constraint
and modify the end of the derivation of the optimal UI formula.











































































































It is convenient to express the wage w = w(a;t) as a function of the implicit total tax on work
























































Combining these results, we obtain the optimal UI formula in the text.
B.3 Estimation of the elasticity of k0 : k; and the elasticity of m0 : µ
Estimation of k. Consider an unemployed workers receiving beneﬁts cu, expecting to receive ce
if employed, and facing a labor market tightness q. We denote by l = e f(q) the hazard rate out
of unemployment. Assume that the worker receives an increase dcu > 0 in beneﬁts, and reduces
his search effort by de < 0, which leads to a reduction dl = f(q)de < 0 in the hazard rate. If we
can measure consumption level, consumption change, hazard rate, and change in hazard rate, we






In turn, this elasticity allows us to estimate the coefﬁcient k. From Lemma A1, dln(e)=dln(Dv) =
1=k. Since we are considering a change in beneﬁts for only one worker, labor market conditions
are not affected by the policy experiment, and q remains constant. Hence dln(l) = dln(e). Fur-

































Estimation of µ. Consider an unemployed workers receiving beneﬁts cu and consuming a total
amount ˆ cu =cu+y. Assume that the worker receives an increase dcu >0 in beneﬁts, and increases
his total consumption by dˆ cu > 0. If we can measure all the consumptions and consumption











In turn, this elasticity allows us to estimate the coefﬁcient µ.
The optimal choice of home production given by (A17), the assumption that m() is isoelastic,
and the identities ˆ cu = y+cu = xcu yield:















































So by measuring the ratio of consumptions x = ˆ cu=cu, estimating the elasticity ˆ e (as in Gruber
[1997]), and estimating the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion r (as in Chetty [2006b]), we can
estimate the coefﬁcient µ.
B.4 Micro-elasticity and macro-elasticity with Nash bargaining
Let L denote the value to a worker of being employed after the matching process. LetU denote the
value to a worker of remaining unemployed after the matching process.
L = (1 t)w
U = bw:
Let t =t +b. The worker’s surplus from an established relationship with a ﬁrm is therefore:
L U = f1 (t +b)gw = (1 t)w:
In our model, the ﬁrm’s surplus from an established relationship is simply given by the hiring cost
ra=q(q) because a ﬁrm can immediately replace a worker at that cost during the matching period.
65Since the bargaining solution divides the surplus of the match between worker and ﬁrm with the














which, combined with (A18), gives both equilibrium labor market tightness q(a;t) and equilib-











Notice that the wage obtained from Nash bargaining is proportional to technology a, and that labor
market tightness does not depend on a: in the model with Nash bargaining, wages are completely



















This is a critical result. Since e
q†
Dc > 0, the macro-elasticity is greater than the micro-elasticity:
eM > em. This can be seen using the result from Lemma 1, which is also valid in this model with
Nash bargaining, and which implies:
e
q†
Dc > 0 , eM > em:
C Derivations in the Inﬁnite-Horizon Model
66C.1 Firm’s and worker’s problem




















I assume that the ﬁrm maximization problem is concave and admits an interior solution (which will
always be the case in equilibrium). Immediately, we can show that employment nd
t is determined
by ﬁrst-order condition (18).




























t is the probability to be employed in period t after period at and fAt(at)g is a collection of
Lagrange multipliers. The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to effort in the current period et gives:
k0(et) = f(qt)At:















Thus, the optimal effort function therefore satisﬁes the Euler equation (17), where we deﬁne (1+
k)  dln(k(e))=dln(e), the elasticity of k() with respect to e.
C.2 Optimal UI formula in the dynamic model
Assumptions. We consider a static equilibrium of the inﬁnite-horizon model: all variables are
constant, technology a is constant, and the net reward from work Dc is constant. We assume that
there is no time discounting: d = 1. In that case, the government chooses Dc to maximize the
per-period social welfare.
Notations. We deﬁne the following functions, which we study in the Appendix:





• effort supply: es : R+R+ ! R+ deﬁned implicitly by the worker’s optimality condition at




+k(1 s)k(es) = Dv; (A19)
where (1+k) is the elasticity of k() with respect to e.




• Equilibrium labor market tightness: q : R++R++ ! R+ is deﬁned implicitly by
nd(q;a) = ns(es(q;Dv(a;Dc));q)
• Equilibrium effort: e : R++R++ ! R+ deﬁned by
e(a;Dc) = es(q(a;Dc);Dv(a;Dc))
• Equilibrium employment: n : R++R++ ! [0;1] deﬁned by
n(a;Dc) = ns(e(a;Dc);q(a;Dc))
• Equilibrium consumption: cu : R++R++ ! R++ is deﬁned by
cu(a;Dc) = n(a;Dc)(w(a) Dc):
























ASSUMPTION A1. The disutility of effort is isoelastic: k(e) = wke1+k=(1+k).



















Proof. First, we differentiate with respect to q the optimality condition (A19) of the jobseeker’s
problem under Assumption A1, keeping Dv ﬁxed:



















































































where the last line derives from Lemma A20.

























Proof. The Beveridge curve (14), implies that
















[s+(1 s)e f(q)]2 = (1 h)
un
q
where 1 h = q f0(q)=f(q) is the elasticity of f(q) with respect to q. Combining this result with




































































We conclude using Lemma A18.


































































using s=f(q) = ue=n. This allows us to conclude.
Derivation. The government chooses Dc to maximize
ns(e;q)v(cu+Dc)+(1 ns(e;q))v(cu) [1 (1 s)ns(e;q)]k(e):













































































This negative term is the cost of the job-rationing externality.



























































Comparison with formula (9) in the one-period model. The sole difference between the op-
timal UI formula (A23) in the inﬁnite-horizon model and formula (9) in the one-period model is
that the term (1+k)k=(k+u)2 replaces the term k=(1+k). This modiﬁcation captures differ-
ences between the two models in the welfare effects of a change in UI. Recall that job rationing
causes a downward adjustment of labor market tightness following a cut in unemployment beneﬁts.
The welfare cost of this adjustment differs on two points between inﬁnite-horizon and one-period
model.
First, the welfare cost of a job loss caused by the equilibrium adjustment of labor market
tightness is Dv+(1 s)k(e) = (1+k)=(u+k)Dv in the inﬁnite-horizon model instead of Dv
in the one-period model. Therefore the correction term in the optimal UI formula is multiplied by
(1+k)=(u+k) in the inﬁnite-horizon model.
The second effect is more subtle. By comparing Lemma A17 to Lemma A1, notice that the

















Since u << 1, the elasticity of optimal effort es(q;Dv) with respect to q is lower in the inﬁnite-
horizon model. This is because the worker’s optimal choice of effort, described by equation (1) in
the one-period model and equation (A19) in the inﬁnite-horizon model, involves a mix of k() and
k0() in the inﬁnite-horizon model instead of only k0() in the one-period model. Since the optimal
effort is less elastic, it falls less for a given reduction in labor market tighness. On the other hand,
the changes in employment following an adjustment in effort and an adjustment in labor market










By deﬁnition, the wedge

em eM


































































describes the adjustment in employment following a change in Dc. Since
the supply of search effort is more inelastic, the elasticity (q=e)(¶es=¶q) is much smaller. To
obtain the same adjustment in employment (as a combination of a change in effort (¶es=¶q)dq
and a change in tightness dq), it is therefore necessary to have a larger adjustment in labor market
tightness dq, which has a larger welfare cost. In other words, ¶q=¶Dc must be larger. In our model,
recall that changes in effort have no welfare effect by the envelope theorem, whereas changes in
labor market tightness, which affect the per-unit job-ﬁnding probability, do have welfare effects.
Comparing the results from Lemma 1 to those of Lemma A19 shows that, for a given wedge 
em eM
, the adjustment in tightness q in response to a change in net reward from work Dc is
larger in the inﬁnite-horizon model. For a given wedge

em eM
between micro- and macro-
elasticity, the amount of job destroyed by the equilibrium adjustment of labor market tightness q is
more important in the inﬁnite-horizon model. The amount of jobs destroyed in the inﬁnite-horizon


































, which implies that the correction term in the optimal UI formula is once more
multiplied by (1+k)=(u+k) in the inﬁnite-horizon model.






























































In the same way as we derive equation (A7) from the ﬁrm’s optimality condition, and using












where h =  qq0(q)=q(q) is minus the elasticity of q() and 1 a =  ng00(n)=g0(n) is minus the
elasticity of g0().
Combining the deﬁnition (A21) of the micro-elasticity, and the expressions of various partial


































































Finally, in the calibration of the inﬁnite-horizon model, we use the micro-elasticity of unemploy-









Given that we know em, we need to determine the elasticity of cu with respect to Dc to compute


















C.4 Optimal unemployment insurance: government’s problem














































t=0 are sequences of Lagrange multipliers. Let B 1  0






































+Dt [(1 (1 s)nt 1)et  f(qt)+(1 s)nt 1 nt]












t )+d(1 s)Et [k(et+1)]+(1 s)Et [Dt+1(1 Et+1f(qt+1)]
+Ct at g00(nt)+At fw(at) (ce
t  cu
t )g:
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the government’s problem with respect to et(at) for t  0 are






 k(1 s)Bt 1k0(et)+Dt ut  f(qt)
0 =  ut k0(et)+
k00(et)
f(qt)
((1 s)Bt 1 Bt) k(1 s)Bt 1k0(et)+Dt ut  f(qt)
0 =  (k+1)ut k(et)+k
k0(et)
f(qt)








where B 1 = 0. The ﬁrst-order conditions of the government’s problem with respect to ce
t(at) for









77The ﬁrst-order conditions of the government’s problem with respect to cu























































[Bt  (1 s)Bt 1] rat [Ct  (1 s)Ct 1];





sequences of Lagrange multipliers from the government’s problem fAt;Bt;Ct;Dtg
+¥
t=0 are charac-





















0 = [1 (1 s)nt 1]et  f(qt) [nt  (1 s)nt 1] (A26)
0 = nt w(at) nt ce
t  (1 nt)cu
t ; (A27)
and the ﬁrst-order conditions from the government’s problem, 8t  0:
Dt = v(ce
t) v(cu
t )+d(1 s)Et [k(et+1)]+(1 s)Et [Dt+1(1 et+1f(qt+1))]








































[Bt  (1 s)Bt 1] rat [Ct  (1 s)Ct 1] (A32)
78where B 1 = 0 and C 1 = 0, ht = nt  (1 s)nt 1, ut = 1 (1 s)nt 1.
C.5 Optimal equilibrium in a static environment
In a static environment, there are no aggregate shocks (at = a for all t), and the labor market in
steady state (equation (14) holds). The solution to the government’s problem in a static environ-
ment is constant: the collection of 9 variables fce;cu;n;q;e;A;B;C;Dg is characterized by the


































































This system of equations (A33)–(A40) is obtained directly from the system of 9 equations (A24)–
(A32), except that we rewrite the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to e and q (when the labor















































































To solve this system for a given aj, we perform a grid search over Dv = [v(ce) v(cu)]. For a
sequence fDvigi, we solve the system of equations (A33)–(A35) to ﬁnd a collection of sequences
fni;ei;qigi. Using (A36) and the deﬁnition Dvi = v(ce
i) v(cu
i ), we compute a collection of se-
quences fce
i;cu
i gi. From these sequences, we compute a collection of sequences fAi;Bi;Ci;Digi by
solving in turn (A38) (to get fAigi), (A39) (to get fBigi), (A40) (to get fCigi),and (A41) (to get
fDigi). Lastly, we pick the index i such that equation (A37) be satisﬁed. The optimal equilibrium
in a static environment with technology aj is fce
i;cu
i;ni;qi;eig, the optimal replacement rate is
t = cu
i=ce
i, the optimal labor tax rate is 1 ce
i=w(a), and the optimal beneﬁt rate is cu
i=w(a). We




j to plot the graphs in Figure 2.
C.6 Log-linearization
x denotes the steady-state value of variable xt. ˇ xt  dlog(xt) denotes the logarithmic deviation of









are characterized by the system of equations (A33)–(A41) in Section C.5
when technology a = a = 1. Moreover h = sn and u = 1 (1 s)n. Using the calibration in
Table 1, we ﬁnd that in steady state, when technology a=1, the optimal replacement rate t=73%,
the optimal tax rate t = 4:0%, the optimal beneﬁt rate b = 70%, and unemployment u = 6:2%.
The log-linearized optimal equilibrium

ˇ ce; ˇ cu; ˇ n; ˇ q; ˇ e
	
and the associated Lagrange multipliers  ˇ A; ˇ B; ˇ C; ˇ D
	
are characterized by the following system of log-linear equations:
• Deﬁnition of unemployment ut = 1 (1 s)nt 1:
ˇ ut +o1 ˇ nt 1 = 0
where o1 = 1 u
u .
• Deﬁnition of number of hires ht = nt  (1 s)nt 1:
(1 s) ˇ nt 1+s ˇ ht   ˇ nt = 0:
80• Law of motion of employment (A26):
ˇ ut + ˇ et +(1 h) ˇ qt   ˇ ht = 0
• Budget constraint (A27):
g ˇ at + ˇ nt  fp1( ˇ nt + ˇ ce
t)+ p2( q1 ˇ nt + ˇ cu
t )g = 0;
with q1 = n=(1 n), p1 = ce
w, and p2 = 1  p1.
• Firm’s optimal hiring decision (A25):
 ˇ at +(1 a) ˇ nt +r1g ˇ at +r2
 




h ˇ qt+1+ ˇ at+1

= 0
with r1 = w 1
aa n1 a, r2 = c
q(q)  1
a n1 a, and r3 = 1 r1 r2.
























s2 = 1 s1, t2 = 1 t1, and t1 =
kd(1 s)k(e)
Dv .



















x=ci and where u1 =
n=v0(ce)
n=v0(ce)+(1 n)=v0(cu), and u2 = 1 u1.
• Lagrange multiplier Bt deﬁned by equation (A30):
ˇ Bt  























v0(ce) v0(cu), and v2 = 1 v1.
• Lagrange multiplier Dt deﬁned by equation (A31):
ˇ Dt + ˇ ut +(1 h)ˇ qt  k ˇ et  

w2 ˇ ut +w3 ˇ Bt 1 w4













k0(e) , and w2 = u=w1, w3 = k(1 s)B=w1, w4 = 1 w2 w3.
81• Lagrange multiplier Ct deﬁned by equation (A32):
ˇ ht  h ˇ qt + ˇ Dt  x6




















where x1 =  hq(q)D
1 h




q , and x6 = x2=x1, x7 = 1 x6.












  ˇ Ct + ˇ at +(a 2) ˇ nt

+y5
  ˇ At +fz3g ˇ at +z4 ˇ ce















, z3 = w
w (ce cu), z4 =   ce




1 ef(q), and z2 = 1 z1, z5 = 1 z3 z4, y5 = 1 y1 y2 y3 y4.
In addition we assume that the log-deviation of technology ˇ at follows an AR(1) process:
ˇ at = n ˇ at 1+zt;
where zt  N(0;s2) is the innovation to technology driving ﬂuctuations in the log-linear model.
We compute the unique stationary rational expectations solution to the log-linear system using
the standard Anderson and Moore [1985] method.This solution allows us to compute the IRFs of
variables to unexpected technology shocks.
C.7 Calibration
We calibrate all parameters at a weekly frequency as shown in Table 1. The calibration strategy
follows closely that in Michaillat [forthcoming], so this section only highlights differences and
novelties. We normalize average search effort ˆ e = 1, and average technology ˆ a = 1.
We use a Cobb-Douglas matching function h(u;o) = whuho1 h and set h = 0:7, in line with
empirical evidence [Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001]. To estimate the matching efﬁciency wh, we
use the Beveridge curve (14) to ﬁnd
wh = s=(1 s)(1  ˆ u)=ˆ u ˆ qh 1: (A42)
Weusetheseasonally-adjusted, monthlyseriesforthenumberofvacanciescollectedbytheBureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) in the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), 2000–2010,
and the seasonally-adjusted, monthly unemployment level computed by the BLS from the Current
82Population Survey (CPS) over the same period, to compute labor market tightness and unemploy-
ment. We ﬁnd ˆ q = 0:47 and ˆ u = 5:9%. The resulting estimate of matching efﬁciency is wh = 0:19.
We calibrate the wage ﬂexibility g based on estimates obtained in micro-data. As discussed in
Michaillat [forthcoming], the ﬂexibility of wages in newly created jobs, and not that in existing
jobs, mostly drives job creation. Furthermore, the estimate closest to this ﬂexibility in US data is
provided by Haefke et al. [2008]. They estimate an elasticity of total earnings of job movers with
respect to productivity of 0.7, using panel data following a sample of production and supervisory
workers over the 1984–2006 period. If there is “cyclical upgrading”, a improvement in the com-
position of jobs accepted by workers in expansions, 0.7 is in fact an upper bound on the elasticity
of wages in newly created jobs. A lower bound for the elasticity of wages in newly created jobs is
the elasticity of wages in existing jobs, estimated in the 0.1–0.45 range with US data [Pissarides,
2009]. Thus we set g = 0:5, in the middle of the range of plausible values.
We choose risk aversion r = 1, which is on the low side of the most compelling estimates
[Chetty, 2004, 2006b]. We choose k = 2:1 such that the micro-elasticity of unemployment 1 n




















be in line with the elasticity of 0.9 estimated by Meyer [1990].26
As summarized by Pavoni and Violante [2007], the state-determined weekly beneﬁts generally
replace between 50% and 70% of the individual’s last weekly pre-tax earnings. Employee’s earn-
ings are subject to a 7:65% payroll taxes: 6.2% is taxed to ﬁnance social security and 1:45% is
taxed to ﬁnance Medicare.27 Hence, we set the replacement rate to ˆ t = 0:6=(1 0:0765) = 65%.
With k = 2:1, r = 1, and ˆ t = 65%, we obtain wk = 0:58 to match ˆ e = 1.
C.8 The government can borrow and save
In this section, we characterize the optimal equilibrium when the government has access to a
complete market for Arrow-Debreu securities. The worker’s and ﬁrm’s problem are unchanged,
and are characterized by (A24) and (A25). The law of motion of unemployment is unchanged, and
is given by (A26). However, we remove the period-by-period budget constraint (A27). There is
now one less equation in the system characterizing the optimal equilibrium, but there is also one
less variable: the Lagrange multiplier At.
26The elasticity estimated by Meyer [1990] is conceptually close to a micro-elasticity because it either controls for
state unemployment rates or uses state ﬁxed effects. Meyer [1990] estimates the elasticity of the hazard rate out of
unemployment with respect to beneﬁts, which equals the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to beneﬁts.
In our model, the hazard rate is e f(q), so unemployment duration is 1=(e f(q))=u=(sn)u=s(1 n)=s. Hence
the elasticity of unemployment 1 n is similar to elasticity of duration with respect to beneﬁts. In the appendix, we
express the micro-elasticity of unemployment with respect to beneﬁts as a function of equilibrium variables n;u;q.
27Prior to 1987, beneﬁt income was exempt from income tax. Since 1987 beneﬁts have been fully taxable, so we
abstract from the income tax.
83TheLagrangianofthegovernment’sproblemisthesameasinSectionC.4, exceptthatLagrange
multiplier on the period-by-period budget constraint, At, is constant over time and across histories:
or all t;at, At(at) = A. This is because the government faces the unique intertemporal budget
constraint (21), which is weighted by one unique Lagrange multiplier. The ﬁrst-order conditions
of the government’s problem simplify accordingly.
We obtain the log-linear system describing the optimal equilibrium by modifying the log-linear
system of Section C.6 accordingly. To be able to simulate the log-linear model, however, we need
to determine the Lagrange multiplier A on the intertemporal budget constraint. A is determined
such that the government’s intertemporal budget constraint (21), which replaces the sequence of
period-by-period budget constraints, be binding. We deﬁne the deﬁcit in period t by
L(St) = nt ce
t +(1 nt)cu
t  nt w(at):








dt E0[L(St)] = 0: (A43)




































+L1 ˇ at +L2 ˇ nt +L3 ˇ ce






+L1E0[ˇ at]+L2E0[ˇ nt]+L3E0[ˇ ce
t]+L4E0[ˇ cu
t ];
where L1;L2;L3;L4 are constant. Using (A43), we infer that the intertemporal budget con-
straint (21) is a linear combination of the expected value of the log-deviations









We compute the unique stationary rational expectations solution to the log-linear system using
the standard Anderson and Moore [1985] method. Let Xt 2Rk be the vector of log-deviations: Xt =
[ˇ at; ˇ nt; ˇ ce
t; ˇ cu
t ;:::]0. Let Zt+1 2Rk be a vector of innovations at timet+1. In our system there is only
one exogenous shock, so there is only one non-zero entry in the vector Zt+1: Zt+1 =[0;0;:::;zt+1]0
where zt+1  N(0;s2). The solution to the log-linear system satisﬁes
Xt+1 = M1Xt +M2Zt+1;
where M1 2 Rkk;M2 2 Rkk are matrices that are constant over time. Taking expectations, and
using the fact that Xt is stationary: for all t  0,
E0[Xt] = E0[Xt+1] = M1E0[Xt]+M2E0[Zt+1] = M1E0[Xt]:
84Since all the eigenvalues from M1 have an absolute value strictly less than one, we infer that for all
t  0, E0[Xt] = 0. Hence the log-linear system is such that
E0[ˇ nt] = E0[ˇ at] = E0[ˇ ce
t] = E0[ˇ cu
t ] = 0:
We conclude that the intertemporal budget constraint is satisﬁed by the solution to the log-linear





Hence to determine A, we need to solve for the steady state of this model, in which the govern-
ment faces the unique budget constraint (21). This steady state is the same as that of the baseline
inﬁnite-horizon model of Section 4.1, in which the government faces a sequence of budget con-
straints (15). So A can be determined by solving the system of equations (A33)–(A40). Obviously,
A is the same as in the steady state of the baseline inﬁnite-horizon model of Section 4.1
C.9 Unemployment beneﬁts of ﬁnite duration
Timing.
• beginning of period t, matching process: unemployed workers search for a job with effort et
• beginning of period t, end of matching process: jobseekers ﬁnd a job with probability et 
f(qt)
• middle of period t: production; workers consume transfer ct from the government
• end of period t, separations: a fraction of employed workers lose their jobs; a fraction lt of
eligible unemployed workers become ineligible
Notations. We introduce three superscripts: e for Employed; u for unemployed worker eligible
to receive Unemployment insurance; a for unemployed worker whose UI expired, and who only
receive social Assistance. We now deﬁne:
• ce
t: consumption of an employed worker
• cu
t : consumption of an unemployed worker who is eligible to receive UI (limited duration)
• ca
t : consumption of a worker who receives social assistance (unlimited duration)
• xu
t and xa




t : probability to be unemployed and receive UI or social assistance in period t after
the matching process, and before the production/consumption process.
• eu
t and ea
t : job-search effort of an unemployed worker who receives UI or social assistance
in period t
















Flows of workers. Given the timing of the model and our notations, the various stocks of em-
































































The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to efforts eu
t and ea
t in the current period gives:
k0(eu
t ) = f(qt)At
k0(ea
t ) = f(qt)Bt:















t +(1 s)dEt [Ct+1]+lt dEt [Dt+1 Ct+1]
Bt = Dv
a;e
t +(1 s)dEt [Dt+1]+sdEt [Dt+1 Ct+1]:
















t ) and Dk0
t =k0(ea
t ) k0(eu











































Also, notice that job-search efforts eu
t and ea














Firm’s problem. Even if beneﬁts have ﬁnite duration, the ﬁrm’s problem is similar to that de-
scribed in Section C.1 in the baseline inﬁnite-horizon model. Hence the optimal hiring behavior of
the ﬁrm satisﬁes (18).

















t . We assume that the govern-







ta;u. Furthermore, we assume that v() = ln(), consistently with our preferred calibration. This
choice allows us to write Dv
u;e
t =  ln(tu;e); Dv
a;e
t =  ln(ta;e); Dv
a;u
t =  ln(ta;u). Under this
assumption, the incentives to search provided by government transfers remain constant over the
business cycle. The government chooses the arrival rate lt of ineligibility to unemployment insur-













subject to a budget constraint for all t:















t=0 of employed and un-














t=0; and subject to the equilibrium condition on the labor market that labor
supply equals labor demand for all t: nt = nd
t , which determines labor market tightness fqtg
+¥
t=0.
Government’s problem in a static environment. We focus on a static environment, , in which
there are no aggregate shocks (at = a for all t), and the labor market in steady state: xa
t = xa; xu
t =
xu; za
t = za; zu
t = zu; nt = n; . In that case, we can simplify the ﬁrst-order conditions of workers’
and ﬁrm’s problems (3 equations), the laws of motion of the stocks of workers (5 equations), and
the budget constraint of the goverment’s problem (1 equation). These 9 constraints describe a
collection of 9 variables fxu;xa;zu;za;n;eu;ea;q;ceg, which constitute an equilibrium with unem-
ployment insurance. All other variables of interest can be constructed from these 9 variables (for
instance, h;u;cu;ca).
Let us construct this system of 9 equations. We ﬁrst express fzu;xu;za;xa;ng as a function of


























ea f(q) + 1 s
s [euf(q)(1 l)+l]































































































We can also derive ce from the resource constraint:
ce = [w(a)n][n+zutu;e+zata;e]
 1: (A56)














+(1 l)dkDk =  ln(ta;u): (A58)





In thisstatic environmentin which thereplacement rates tu;e and ta;e are ﬁxed, given technology
a, the government’s problem is to pick the arrival rate l (or equivalently the expected unemploy-
ment beneﬁt duration 1=l) to maximize per-period social welfare:
 xuk(eu) xak(ea)+ln(ce)+zuln(tu;e)+zaln(ta;e); (A60)
where fzu;za;xu;xa;eu;ea;ceg, together with fn;qg, solve the system of equations (A51)–(A59).
To ﬁnd the optimal equilibrium in a static environment for a given aj, we compute a sequence
of equilibria with unemployment insurance for a sequence of arrival rates fligi. To solve for
an equilibrium with unemployment insurance under technology aj and arrival rate li, we per-
form a grid search over q. For a sequence fqkgk, we solve the system of equations (A57)–(A58)






k. Using equations eq:sys1–(A55), we then compute














k. Next, we pick the indice k such that equation (A59) be satisﬁed. An equilibrium










. We repeat this computation for the sequence of arrival rate
fligi, and we pick the equilibrium with the highest per-period welfare (A60). This gives us the
optimal equilibrium and optimal arrival rate under technology aj. We repeat this computation for




j to plot the graphs in Figure 5.
Calibration. We calibrate this model similarly as the baseline model calibrated in Section C.7.
We only need to adjust the calibration of the matching efﬁciency wh and the disutility of effort
wk. To do so, we set unemployment beneﬁts at 78% of the pre-tax wage, social assistance at
1=278% = 39% of the pre-tax wage, such that an expected duration of 26 weeks be optimal
when the unemployment rate is at its average level of 5:9%.28 We normalize ˆ eu  ˆ xu + ˆ ea  ˆ xa = ˆ u
to determine wh = 0:19 using (A42). Keeping k = 2:1, we solve a system of three unknowns:
ˆ ea; ˆ eu;wk, and three equations: (A57), (A58), and ˆ u = ˆ eu  ˆ xu + ˆ ea  ˆ xa, to ﬁnd wk = 0:43. In this
system of three equations, we substituted ˆ xa; ˆ xu by the functions of ˆ ea; ˆ eu given by (A51) and (A52).
As a byproduct, we ﬁnd ˆ ea = 1:40 and ˆ eu = 0:94.
In steady state, when technology a = 1, we ﬁnd that: the optimal arrival rate l = 3:9%,
corresponding to an expected duration of 26 weeks for unemployment beneﬁts; unemployment
u = 5:9%; 15% of unemployed workers are ineligible and 85% are eligible.
D Empirical Evidence from the CWBH
The data we use is from the Continuous Wage and Beneﬁt History (CWBH). The dataset records
all employment and unemployment history for workers in 8 States from 1976 to 1983.29 The
advantage of CWBH data is that it is administrative data with accurate information on weeks of
UI receipt, pre-unemployment earnings, the level of UI beneﬁts, and the potential duration of
beneﬁts over time. Since we do not observe individuals after their beneﬁts lapse, we censor their
unemployment spells at the time they exhaust their beneﬁts. Our duration outcome of interest is
the total number of weeks for which UI was claimed. Since a lot of claims exhibit interruptions, we
restrict our sample to individuals for which there is no more than 2 weeks of interruption between
28These rates are much higher than what is observed in the US. We saw in Section C.7 that beneﬁts replace 60%
of pre-tax earnings, well below 78%. Furthermore, Pavoni and Violante [2007] compute that in 1996, the median
monthly allotment of food stamps for a family of four was $397 per month. Using CPS data, they ﬁnd that the median
monthly post-tax wage for a worker with at most a high-school diploma, eligible to be on welfare rolls, is $1,540.
Hence, if food stamps are the only social assistance available when unemployment beneﬁts are exhausted, the rate of
social assistance is roughly 397=1;540 = 26%, well below 39%.
29We use the exhaustive CWBH ﬁles and therefore our data is different from the limited sample used in Mofﬁtt
[1985] or Meyer [1990] which contains only 3,365 observations. Our estimation sample contains 39,852 unemploy-
ment spells. We thank Patricia Anderson and Bruce Meyer for giving us access to the CWBH data.
90each week of beneﬁts.30 We also eliminate observations with recalls and partial UI claims (i.e.
people getting UI while still partially at work).
D.1 Graphical Evidence
In order to identify the micro-elasticity, we investigate the effect of UI beneﬁts using only within
stateperiod variations in individual beneﬁts. We begin with some graphical evidence. To make
sure that individual variation in Weekly Beneﬁts Amounts (WBA) is not correlated with other char-
acteristics such as previous wage or tenure that might affect unemployment duration, we regress
beneﬁts on a series of non parametric controls for previous wage, number of quarters worked in the
year prior to unemployment, education, gender, and quarter and state ﬁxed effects interacted. The
residual variation in beneﬁt is likely to be exogenous, and comes primarily from non-linearities in
the WBA schedule as well as from special state rules regarding total beneﬁt amounts in a given
beneﬁt year. We then classify unemployment spells in high and low WBA regimes using the resid-
uals from the previous regression. A spell is in a low WBA regime if the residual WBA is below
the 25th percentile of the distribution of residuals in the state for the quarter during which the spell
started. A spell is in a high WBA regime if the residual WBA is over the 75th percentile of the
distribution of residuals in the state for the quarter during which the spell started.
As in Kroft and Notowidigdo [2011], Figure A1 shows the survival estimates for the duration
of unemployment spells in the CWBH dataset for spells broken down by low versus high unem-
ployment regimes as well as by low versus high WBA regimes.31 We retrieve the non-parametric
baseline hazard from a Cox proportional hazard model with State and year ﬁxed effects interacted,
also controlling for observable characteristics of the unemployed (previous wage level, age, edu-
cation, marital status, ethnicity, number of dependents) and stratiﬁed in low (dark lines) vs. high
(gray lines) individual WBA regimes. Most importantly, we estimate this model separately for low
vs high unemployment regimes. To break down spells by low vs high unemployment regimes we
use variation in unemployment rate across states as proxies for business cycle conditions. A spell
is in a low unemployment regime if at the beginning of the spell, the quarterly unemployment rate
of the state is below the median unemployment rate of all the states in the US.32
The ﬁgure conﬁrms that the baseline survival rate is higher when individual beneﬁts are higher.
The effect seems to be very similar in high and low unemployment regimes when we control for
local labor market tightness. To investigate the cyclicality of the micro-elasticity, we now turn to
semi-parametric estimation methods.
30We also looked at the total number of weeks for which UI was paid, as well as the duration of initial spells (total
number of weeks claimed without interruption after the initial claim was ﬁled) and found similar results.
31We report for each unemployment regime the baseline survival function estimated at the mean of the covariates.
32We use variations in unemployment rate across states as proxies for business cycle conditions following Kroft and
Notowidigdo [2011]. We ﬁnd similar results using other measures of labor market conditions. In particular, we ﬁnd
similar results using unemployment rate variations within state over time and deﬁning high unemployment spells as
spells that started when the state unemployment rate was over its 1976-2010 median.
91D.2 Semi-Parametric Estimation
To identify the micro-elasticity and its cyclical behavior, we estimate the effect of beneﬁts once
again using only within stateyear variations in individual WBA. We ﬁt a Cox proportional hazard
model with State and year ﬁxed effects interacted, and controlling for observable characteristics
of the unemployed (age, education, marital status, ethnicity, number of dependents). We control
for time to beneﬁt exhaustion by adding a 6-pieces exhaustion spline as in Meyer [1990]. Most
importantly, we also introduce a series of non parametric controls for previous wage and previous
work experience. In particular, we add 10 dummies for previous wage level, and dummies for the
number of quarters worked in the year prior to unemployment. With this rich set of controls, the
residual variation in UI beneﬁts comes primarily from non-linearities in the beneﬁts schedule and
is more likely to be exogenous. Results are displayed in table A1. Using the approximation that
log(D) = log(1=h), where D stands for duration and h is the hazard rate, the duration elasticity
and other marginal effects of interest are given by the negative of the coefﬁcient in the estimated
hazard model.
Column (1) begins by replicating the speciﬁcation of Meyer [1990], Table VI, column (7). This
speciﬁcation controls for previous wages using the log of earnings in the base period, and also
controls for state ﬁxed effects. Not surprisingly, and even if we use a different (much larger) sam-
ple than the one used in Meyer [1990], the results are almost exactly identical, with a duration
elasticity of 0.587 versus 0.599 in Meyer [1990]. In order to control for the fact that the beneﬁt
level depends on previous earnings and experience, column (2) introduces much richer controls
with 10 dummies for previous earnings level and a set of dummy variables for the number of quar-
ters worked in the year preceding unemployment. Interestingly, the duration elasticity is almost
divided by two by the introduction of these controls. This suggests that the magnitude of the es-
timates of Meyer [1990] is actually driven for a large part by the correlation between earnings
and UI beneﬁts. When controlling more ﬂexibly for this correlation, the impact of UI beneﬁts on
duration becomes signiﬁcantly smaller. To come closer to the estimation of the micro-elasticity,
column (3) uses only within stateyear variations in individual beneﬁts by adding state and time
ﬁxed effects interacted. This speciﬁcation has also the advantage of addressing the potential issue
of the endogeneity of UI beneﬁt variations over time, if the schedule of state UI beneﬁts is endoge-
nously modiﬁed when labor market conditions change over time. Results show that the duration
elasticity is actually very similar in magnitude to that in column (2). We now investigate the cycli-
cal behavior of these estimates. To do so, we begin in column (4) by interacting log beneﬁts with
a dummy for being in a high unemployment regime, deﬁned, as above, as beginning an unemploy-
ment spell in a state whose unemployment rate is above the median unemployment rate in the US.
The coefﬁcient on the interaction term is the incremental change in the duration elasticity for spells
in high unemployment regimes compared to low unemployment regimes. Our results show that the
duration elasticity is very similar in low unemployment regimes: .34 (.038), and high unemploy-
ment regimes: .32 (.037). In column (5) we look at an alternate speciﬁcation where we deﬁne state
labor market conditions in absolute terms instead of relative terms. We interact log beneﬁts with
a dummy for spells beginning in states with unemployment rate superior to 8% (8.1% being the
median unemployment rate for all statequarter cells in our sample). The interaction term in this
92speciﬁcation is small and not signiﬁcantly different from 0. In column (6), we allow for a more
ﬂexible interaction between labor market conditions and log beneﬁts. We create four dummies for
spells beginning in states with: (1) unemployment rate below the 25th percentile of unemployment
rates (for all state*quarter cells in our sample), (2) between the 25th percentile and the median,
(3) above the median and below the 75th percentile, and (4) above the 75th percentile. We then
interact log beneﬁts with these four dummies. Results show that the duration elasticity is slightly
decreasing with higher unemployment regimes, but the duration elasticities are not signiﬁcantly
different from one another.
Overall, this evidence is suggestive that the micro-elasticity of unemployment duration with
respect to beneﬁt level is not signiﬁcantly different in high and low unemployment regimes, and
conﬁrms the results obtained by Schmieder et al. [2011] for the micro-elasticity with respect to
potential duration.
Unfortunately the CWBH does not span a long time period and therefore does not exhibit
enough variations in average UI beneﬁts within state over time to investigate the cyclical behav-
ior of the macro-elasticity. The elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the average
beneﬁt level in each statequarter that we ﬁnd when ﬁtting the Cox proportional hazard model de-
scribed above, excluding state ﬁxed effects, is higher for low unemployment regimes than for high
unemployment regimes. But the robustness of such estimates is questionable. They suffer from
a potentially serious omitted variable bias because beneﬁts are higher in states with unobserved
time-invariant characteristics which are correlated with high expected unemployment durations.
93Table A1: Semi-Parametric Estimates of Hazard Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Meyer [1990]
log(UI) -0.587 -0.274 -0.320 -0.341 -0.323
(0.0394) (0.0365) (0.0368) (0.0374) (0.0370)
State unemployment rate -0.0550 -0.0552 -0.0207 -0.0226 -0.0251 -0.105















previous wage & experience NO YES YES YES YES YES
Yearstate F-E NO NO YES YES YES YES
# Spells 39852 39852 39852 39852 39852 39852
Log-likelihood -136305.0 -136364.8 -135976.0 -135971.4 -135975.7 -135946.2
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
Notes: This table estimates the effect of UI weekly beneﬁts levels on the hazard rate of leaving UI using the CWBH
complete data for 8 US states from the late 1970s to early 1980s. We ﬁt Cox proportional hazard models. All
speciﬁcations include controls for gender, ethnicity, marital status, year of schooling, a 6-pieces exhaustion spline and
state ﬁxed effects. u denotes the state unemployment rate. log(UI) denotes the log-weekly UI beneﬁt amount. p25
and p75 denote the 25th and 75th percentile of unemployment rates (among all statequarter in our data). Column
(1) replicates the speciﬁcation of Meyer [1990], Table VI, column (7) (Meyer [1990] was using a much smaller
dataset). Column (2) further adds non-parametric controls for previous earnings and experience. column (3) further
adds yearstate ﬁxed effects. Columns (4) and (5) add the interaction of log(UI) and high unemployment dummies
(unemployment rate above the median across all US states in the same quarter in column (4) and unemployment rate
above 8% in column (5)). Column (6) adds the interaction of log(UI) with quartiles for the level of unemployment
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Figure A1: Survival Estimates With StateYear F.-E.
Source: CWBH
Notes: The Figure displays the baseline survival function estimates for the duration of unemployment spells broken
down by low (plain lines) vs high (dash lines) unemployment regimes. A spell is in a low unemployment regime if
at the beginning of the spell, the monthly unemployment rate of the State is below the median unemployment rate of
all the States in the US. We also break down spells in high and low individual WBA regimes. A spell is in a high
individual WBA regime if the residual WBA in a regression of WBA on a series of non parametric controls for wage,
education, genderplusyearandstateﬁxedeffectsinteracted, isbelowthe25thpercentileofthedistributionofresiduals
in the state for the quarter during which the spell started. A spell is in a high UI beneﬁt regime if the residual WBA
is over the 75th percentile of the distribution of residuals in the state for the quarter during which the spell started.
The baseline survival function estimate is obtained from a Cox proportional hazard model including state and year
ﬁxed effects interacted and controlling for observable characteristics of the unemployed (previous wage level, age,
education, marital status, ethnicity, number of dependents). The model is stratiﬁed in low (dark lines) vs high (gray
lines) individual WBA regimes and estimated in high and low unemployment regimes. The model exploits only within
Stateyear variation in beneﬁts and therefore identiﬁes the micro elasticity. The ﬁgure shows that higher individual
beneﬁts increases unemployment duration but that this effect is almost similar in high and low unemployment regimes.
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